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RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS//APPELLEES' 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
For purposes of continuity, the following comments adhere to 
the paragraph numbering found in LaSal Oil Company's ("LaSal") 
Appellant's Brief, which numbering was continued in 
Defendants/Appellee's ("Defendants," "insurers" or the "insurance 
companies") brief. 
42. As further clarification of Dr. Pitt's testimony/ LaSal's 
adds the following: 
Defendants have quoted the testimony of Dr. Pitt, LaSal's 
expert, concerning the leak in the section of pipe, Exhibit l-P 
(Defendants' Brief at 4) . Dr. Pitt's testimony should be quoted in 
full, however, in order to understand the import of his opinion: 
The process that I visualize that occurred was that—from 
the facts there were presented to me, is that the 
corrosion likely occurred as a result of what we call 
straight current corrosion, which is involved with 
cathodic protection systems that are close to pipes, and 
the corrosion process occurs as the current is flowing 
through the pipe and various areas in the pipe. The 
metal goes into solution due to that corrosive current 
and is lost from the surface of the pipe. 
And in this case, it occurred in—the corrosion occurred 
in a number of localized areas. The corrosion proceeded 
to continue until at some point in time the metal was 
thin enough to burst suddenly from the inside pressure of 
the pipe. And in my opinion that is what caused at least 
one of the holes present. 
Q: Okay. Now, you say that it burst suddenly through 
the pipe caused by the—you have a corroded pipe and you 
have pressure inside, and at some point because of that 
pressure a hole was burst through it and suddenly created 
in that pipe? 




44. As clarification to the statement made by Defendants in 
Paragraph 44 (Defendants7 Brief at 5-6) and the statements made by 
the insureds' in their argument (Defendants7 Brief at 27-28), LaSal 
adds the following: 
According to Defendants, Dr. Alex, Defendants' expert, 
testified that ff[i]n his opinion, this type of leak typically would 
progress from simply moisture on the outside to drops forming in a 
matter of days to weeks, and from a few drops to a gradual trickle 
of gasoline over a matter of weeks to months." Dr. Alex's response 
to Defendants' counsel's question is as follows: 
Q: Typically do you have an opinion as to how long would 
it take to get from the point where you have the initial, 
as you said, osmotic process where its moisture on the 
outside, to the time when you have drops forming? What 
kind of time frame are you looking at? Can you give an 
opinion as to that? 
A: Days to weeks. 
R. 3271-3272. 
The insurers further state (Defendants' Brief at 27-28) that 
LaSal's expert, EarthFax Engineering, Inc. ("EarthFax") , "has 
concluded that the onset of the gasoline release occurred sometime 
between February, 1983 and September, 1984. . . . The pipe was not 
uncovered and removed until approximately January 30, 198 6, when 
the leak was located and repaired. (R. 3223.)" This statement, 
although correct, is taken out of context and does not present a 
full picture of the nature of EarthFax's analysis and the 
underlying assumption that EarthFax was required to make by the 
trial court. 
In May, 1991, counsel for the parties presented oral argument 
to the trial court on their motions for summary judgment. After 
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reviewing the briefs, documentation and hearing oral argument, the 
trial court expressed its concern regarding whether it could rule 
on the issues of duty to defend and duty to indemnity when so 
little was known about the timing of the alleged release of 
gasoline at the LaSal Station. Consequently, the trial court 
requested that additional discovery be undertaken by LaSal in order 
to ascertain both the timing of the release of gasoline and the 
timing of property damage and/or personal injury to plaintiffs and 
the State of Utah in the Underlying Actions. 
In response to the trial court's request, LaSal's consultant, 
EarthFax, reviewed and analyzed available data and undertook 
additional sampling in order to estimate the timing of a possible 
gasoline leak at the LaSal Station. The analysis assumed, for 
purposes of that analysis only, that all of the hydrocarbon 
contamination alleged in the Underlying Actions resulted solely 
from the leak at the LaSal Station (R. 1630).l 
Based on the assumptions (1) that the LaSal Station was the 
sole source of hydrocarbon contamination in Moab, (2) that all 
gasoline discharged from the LaSal Station was from the perforated 
pipe found on the west side of the service station, and (3) that 
gasoline from the perforated pipe reached the water table within a 
few days, EarthFax concluded that the date on which the discharge 
of gasoline commenced at the LaSal Station fell sometime between 
February 1983 and September 1984 (R. 1630-1636, 1655-1656). The 
assumption used by EarthFax, namely, that LaSal was responsible for 
1
 EarthFax's analysis and conclusions are found in a report 
entitled "Potential Timing of Hydrocarbon Leakage at LaSal Oil 
Company," (the "1991 EarthFax Report"). (R. 1640-1663.) 
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all hydrocarbon contamination alleged in the Underlying Actions, 
was required by the trial court even though LaSal steadfastly 
maintained in defense of itself in the Underlying Actions that the 
leak in the underground pipe, discovered in January, 1986, did not 
contribute to the pollution of the groundwater in Moab. Rather, 
LaSal maintained that the hydrocarbon contamination complained of 
in the Underlying Actions resulted from years of leaking pipes at 
the Rio Vista Service Station (the "Rio Vista Station"), the other 
named defendant in the Underlying Actions. Furthermore, LaSal 
claimed (and still claims) that it is just as likely that the leak 
began a short time prior to its discovery in January 1986, and not 
sometime between February 1983 and September 1984. Consequently, 
the fact that EarthFax estimated the initiation of the leakage as 
falling sometime in 1983-1984 is in essence an artifice, and should 
not be now used against LaSal by the Defendants to indicate that 
there has been a steady leak for a two and one-half to three-year 
period. 
The following additional facts are relevant to this case: 
45. The underground lines at the LaSal Station connecting the 
underground tanks with the dispensers, including the line in which 
the leak was found, were maintained at a pressure of 25 to 3 0 
pounds per square inch (pps) when the dispenser was switched off. 
When the dispenser pump was switched on, the underground lines 
(again, including the line in which the leak was found) were 
subjected to between 40 and 45 pps (Testimony of C. Ray Klepzig, 
owner of the LaSal Station, R. 3215). 
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46. Mr. Klepzig further testified that prior to finding the 
leak, the LaSal Station inventory records had not reflected any 
loss of product or any other factors that would have put him on 




Under General Tenants of Contract Interpretation, 
The Pollution Exclusion Should be Strictly 
Construed Against the Insurers 
For over thirty years the Utah Supreme Court has adhered to 
the fundamental rule that "insurance policies should be strictly 
construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured because 
they are adhesion contracts drafted by the insurance companies.ff 
U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993). In 
Sandt, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-held position 
regarding the one-sided nature of insurance contracts: 
Normally, the details and provisions of the policy are 
not discussed, except that the particular form of policy 
is best suited to give the applicant the protection he 
seeks. If he reads the policy he is generally not in a 
position to understand its details, terms, and meaning 
except that, in the event against which he seeks 
insurance, the company will pay the stipulated sums. He 
seldom sees the policy until it has been issued and is 
delivered to him. He signs an application blank in which 
the policy sought is described either by form number or 
by a general designation, pays his premium, and in due 
course thereafter receives, either from the agent or 
through the mails, his policy. Many of its terms and all 
of its defenses and super-refinements he has never heard 
of and would not understand them if he read them. Such 
fact is evident from the fact that cases like this arise 
where lawyers and courts disagree as to what such 
provisions mean. . . . For this reason the rule of 
strictissimi juris has been applied almost universally to 
insurance contracts, and this jurisdiction, like many 
others, has declared in favor of a liberal construction 
in favor of the insured to accomplish the purpose for 
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which the insurance was taken out and for which the 
premium was paid. 
Id. at 522, citing Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 94 
Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060, 1073 (1937). Under this rule of 
interpretation, "the insured is entitled to the broadest protection 
that he could reasonably believe the commonly understood meaning of 
its terms afforded him." Id. at 523, citing P.E. Ashton Co. v. 
Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 164, 406 P.2d 306, 308 (1965). 
The Sandt court adduced from these general rules of 
construction that inconsistent provisions, that is, separate 
provisions which can be construed to afford coverage and at the 
same time to exclude coverage, must be construed in favor of 
coverage. As a corollary, according to the Sandt court, provisions 
that limit or exclude coverage must be construed strictly against 
the insurance company. It therefore follows that any clause which 
excludes or reduces liability must contain explicit language that 
is clear to the insured and not just to those familiar with 
insurance law, namely, lawyers, judges and insurers. Id. at 524-
525. 
Where the terms used in the policy "may be understood to have 
two or more plausible meanings," those terms are a fortiori 
ambiguous. Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Ins. Co. , 790 P.2d 581, 
583 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In the instant case, the insurers7 
position regarding the interpretation of "sudden and accidental" in 
the pollution exclusion, while arguably plausible to someone 
trained in technical construction, is ambiguous when read by the 
typical, reasonable insured. This is clearly illustrated if one 
compares the reasonable expectations of the insured in Gridlev 
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Assoc, v, Transamerica Ins, Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
with those of LaSal. Moreover, the insurers' interpretation of the 
pollution exclusion leads to wholly irreconcilable results, 
depending upon the process whereby a containment vessel—such as an 
underground storage tank or line—is breached; this, despite the 
fact that the exception to the pollution exclusion says nothing at 
all about the cause or process which results in a discharge. 
POINT II 
The Term "Sudden and Accidental11 Found Within 
the Exception to the Pollution Exclusion 
Is Not, as the Insurers Contend, "Clear" 
LaSal's insurers, in response to LaSal's argument that "sudden 
and accidental" is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, 
claim that under basic rules of contract interpretation no 
ambiguity exists in the phrase "sudden and accidental" 
(Defendants' Brief at 10-12). In essence, the insurers' primary 
argument is that the "better reasoned cases," i.e., those whose 
definition of "sudden and accidental" comports with the insurers' 
position, requires that "sudden" have a temporal element. 
Furthermore, the insurance companies would have this Court reject 
out of hand two lines of evidence which have been weighed by other 
courts in determining whether coverage was afforded an insured 
whose policy contains a "sudden and accidental" exception to the 
pollution exclusion: the existence of multiple dictionary 
definitions for the word "sudden," and the existence of extensive 
judicial debate among jurisdictions over the meaning of the term 
"sudden." These two lines of evidence, while arguably not 
dispositive, are compelling evidence that ambiguity indeed exists 
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in the phrase "sudden and accidental," despite the insurers' 
argument to the contrary. 
In support of their position, the insurance companies point to 
the analysis found in Newcastle County v. Hartford Accident and 
Indem. Co. , 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991) wherein the Third Circuit 
reasoned that conflicting precedent and the multiplicity of 
dictionary definitions of the word "sudden" might not render that 
term ambiguous. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that 
under Delaware law the phrase "sudden and accidental" was in fact 
ambiguous. Thus, even though the Third Circuit stated that 
"dictionaries define words in the abstract," it nevertheless 
concluded that "sudden" had more than one reasonable definition: 
The district court simply began its analysis by doing 
that which any reasonable person would do: it looked the 
word up in the dictionary. Upon discovering that 
Webster's dictionary offers several definitions of the 
word "sudden," the district court quite reasonably 
concluded that this suggests that the "word has more than 
one reasonable definition." 
Id. at 1194. Furthermore, the Third Circuit, in acknowledging that 
two contrasting lines of cases exist, stated that "we cannot help 
but view such a division as at least suggesting that the term 
"sudden" is susceptible of more than one reasonable definition." 
Id. at 1196. 
. LaSal's insurers also direct this Court's attention to a 
number of recent cases wherein the term "sudden and accidental" has 
been interpreted to be unambiguous. See, e.g., Hartford Accident 
and Indem. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th 
Cir. 1992), cert, denied, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Hartford 
Accident and Indem. Corp., 113 S.Ct. 411 (1992); Anaconda Minerals 
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Co, v. Stoller Chemical Co. , 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins, Corp., 1993 
W.L. 241520 (Fla. July 1, 1993); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-
Cell-0 Corp., 702 F.Supp. 1317, 1324 (E.D. Mich. 1988), quoted in 
Hartford, 962 F.2d at 1498, n. 6. 
These cases, however, are factually distinguishable from the 
case at bar because the pollution in question involved routine 
discharges that were part of the insureds' regular business 
operations. These discharges were also continuous insofar as 
"continuous" signifies that the releases of pollutants happened 
over and over again on an ongoing basis with the insureds' 
knowledge.2 In Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity 
and Guar. Co. , 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992), for example, the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah which found that "sudden and 
accidental" in the pollution exclusion meant "occurring without 
notice and happening by chance." Id. at 1486 (emphasis added). In 
Hartford, the pollution at issue was the disposal of used PCBs by 
"routinely draining the contaminants directly into the ground or 
periodically draining them into concrete sumps, which were later 
pumped out into dirt pits. Some pits contained pipes designed to 
discharge any waste overflow directly into the surrounding ground." 
2
 The term "continuous" is, unfortunately, as ambiguous as the 
term "sudden," when used in the context of describing both the 
release of pollutants and the pollution itself. Thus, "continuous" 
may refer to a single event of uninterrupted duration or to a 
series of spatially/temporally related events as, for example, "a 
continuous series of blasts; a continuous row of warehouses." See, 
Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 440 (2d ed. 1987); 
The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 910 (1971). 
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Hartford Accident and Indem. Co, v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. , 
675 F.Supp. 677, 679 (D. Utah 1991). 
The insurer in Hartford argued that this regular, repeated 
discharge of waste materials over a period of years could not be 
interpreted as "sudden and accidental." The district court agreed, 
holding that the deliberate and repeated business practice of 
disposing of contaminants "did not occur without notice and by 
chance." Id. at 680. In so holding, the district court rejected 
the line of cases which interpreted "sudden and accidental" to mean 
"unexpected and unintended," but was silent as to whether "sudden 
and accidental" had a temporal aspect. Under the district court's 
analysis in Hartford (whereby it found that "sudden and accidental" 
meant "happening without notice and occurring by chance"), the leak 
at the LaSal Station would necessarily be deemed "sudden and 
accidental" because it too happened "without notice and by chance." 
Similarly, in Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chemical Co., 
Inc.. 773 F.Supp. 1498 (D. Utah 1991), aff'd, 990 F.2d 1175 (10th 
Cir. 1993) , at issue was liability for the cleanup of flue dust 
used in the manufacturing operations of Stoller's predecessor. 
Flue dust was released and disbursed in the regular course of 
unloading, transporting and processing the flue dust. Moreover, 
waste materials were dumped in a pit south of the manufacturing 
facility and exposure to the elements regularly affected the piles 
of flue dust and waste material on the property. Other materials 
were transported to the plant site as part of experiments to see if 
they were usable in fertilizer products and, when the experiments 
proved unsuccessful, these products were dumped in waste piles at 
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the site. The trial court found that there was "nothing even 
remotely 'sudden' about ongoing and regular polluting events" at 
the manufacturing site. Id. at 1505. See also. Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 702 F.Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988) 
(day-to- day manufacturing practices, tank spillage and ruptured 
pipes which contaminated the groundwater were expected by the 
manufacturer and therefore held not to be "sudden and accidental"); 
Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 1993 
W.L. 241520 (Fla. July 1, 1993) (placement of waste oil sludge in 
unlined storage ponds from which chemicals then leached into the 
soil and groundwater, along with other polluting events, held not 
to be "sudden and accidental"). 
It is clear that the "sudden and accidental" language in the 
exception to the pollution exclusion is subject to at least two 
reasonable, alternative interpretations depending upon whether a 
pollutant has been discharged from a containment vessel without the 
knowledge or intent of the insured or whether it has been knowingly 
released through a series of day-to-day activities in the regular 
course of the insured7s business. The problem of interpreting the 
term "sudden" arises, at least in part, because the insurance 
industry has used "sudden" in insurance policies issued to 
manufacturers who, in the every day course of their businesses, 
intentionally and knowingly release pollutants to the environment, 
as well as in policies issued to companies, such as LaSal, who have 
valuable product in containment vessels which pollute, if released 
inadvertently into the environment. The problem in interpretation, 
therefore, rests squarely on the insurance industry which should 
- 11 -
have chosen a less "slippery" word to cover fundamentally distinct 
types of events• Having chosen the word "sudden" which, depending 
upon the particular context, is reasonably susceptible to more than 
one interpretation, including "unexpected" and "unintended," the 
term must be construed against the insurers. In the instant case, 
"sudden" must be construed against Omaha and Carriers, and in favor 
of LaSal to provide coverage for the release of gasoline at the 
LaSal Station. 
POINT III 
The Trial Court Erred When It Held That the Release of 
Gasoline From LaSal's Underground Line Was Not Sudden 
Even assuming the term "sudden" has a temporal aspect, the 
trial court nevertheless erred in holding that the release at the 
LaSal Station was not "sudden." This necessarily follows from the 
Gridley court's correct interpretation of the term "sudden" as 
requiring merely that the initiation of the discharge itself be 
sudden in order to fall within the exception to the pollution 
exclusion, irrespective of the length of time which elapses prior 
to discovery of a leak. Gridley Assoc, v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 
828 P.2d at 527. See also, Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident 
Ins. Co. of America, 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993); Claussen v. 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 259 Ga. 333, 380 S.E.2d 686 (1979); 
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus.. Inc., 4 07 
Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568, (1990), cert, denied, U.S. , 
112 S.Ct. 969 (1992). 
LaSal's insurers, on the other hand, contend that 
interpretation of the term "sudden" turns on distinctions among the 
causative processes which lead to a breach in a containment vessel. 
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The insurers/ disingenuous focus on the cause of the leak rather 
than the initial discharge is no more than an ill-disguised attempt 
to divert the Court's attention from the fact that the exception to 
the pollution exclusion concerns the release, not the process 
resulting in the release• According to the insurance companies, 
the cases to which this Court should look "distinguish between 
differing causes of leaks as a means of deciding the true nature of 
leaks," that is, whether they are sudden or not (Defendants' Brief 
at 19)(emphasis added). Under the insurers' approach, a process 
which occurs over a lengthy period of time, as for example 
corrosion, results in a gradual release whereas a process which 
occurs over a shorter period of time results in a sudden release. 
According to this reasoning, the initial discharge of gasoline from 
the Gridley pipe was "sudden" whereas the initial discharge from 
the LaSal pipe was not. (Defendants' Brief at 16-18) . From this 
perceived distinction in causative processes, the insurers conclude 
that LaSal has no insurance coverage, whereas Gridley was afforded 
coverage. This analysis is flawed. 
A. Any Attempt to Distinguish the Facts in Gridley From the 
Facts Now Before This Court Leads to Irreconcilable 
Results. 
In relating the facts in Gridley, this Court stated: 
The uncontroverted fact before the district court was 
that the break in the gasoline line was a "clean break" 
that "would have had to have been caused by an adjustment 
of the area in which it is in." No evidence was ever 
presented that the break was caused by corrosion or 
deterioration which would have resulted in a gradual drip 
or trickle of gasoline from the line. 
Id. at 527. 
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The facts in Gridlev, LaSal respectfully submits, are somewhat 
more complex. The importance of this complexity, while not 
apparent to this Court when the decision in Gridlev was announced, 
is significant when the Court is faced with construction of the 
same exception to the pollution exclusion but with a slight 
variation on the facts. According to the statement of facts found 
in Transamerica's Brief in Gridley,3 the "leak occurred in a 
section the pipe which had been weakened by the gradual process of 
electrolysis" (Transamerica Brief at 6). 
According to the testimony of Billie Gene Hankins,4 who 
apparently was the only witness to testify as to the break in the 
fuel line at the Gridley station, approximately 25% to 30% of the 
pipe had been corroded away (Hankins Deposition at 41-42). Hankins 
testified that the corrosion would have weakened the pipe prior to 
the event which caused the final rupture, thereby making the 
corroded pipe more susceptible to damage than an uncorroded pipe 
(Hankins Deposition at 51-52) . Hankins further testified that the 
final break in the pipe "would have to have been caused by an 
adjustment of the area in which it is in. Something would have had 
to have moved that area." (Hankins Deposition at 9.) The broken 
line, according to Hankins, was located only a few inches below 
newer lines which were not broken. Hankins testified that the 
3
 A copy of relevant portions of Defendant/Appellant 
Transamerica Insurance Company's Brief in Gridley v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co. is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (the "Transamerica 
Brief"). 
4
 A copy of the Deposition Transcript of Billie Gene Hankins 
(the "Hankins Deposition") taken in Gridlev v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co. is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." The Hankins Deposition was 
attached as Exhibit G to the Transamerica Brief. 
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ruptured pipe was definitely the older of the pipes. This opinion 
was based on Hankins's observation of the amount of corrosion 
present on the broken pipe in contrast to the absence of corrosion 
on the "newer" pipes (Hankins Deposition 41-42, 48, 53). Hankins 
opined that the final event which ruptured the line was caused by 
some type of earth movement as, for example, heavy equipment or an 
earthquake. Thus, although the break is characterized as a "clean 
break" by the Gridley court, it is clear from the evidence before 
the trial court that the line in which the break appeared was also 
heavily corroded. It is significant, therefore, that the lines 
adjacent to and above the broken line—lines which were not broken 
by the hypothesized earth movement—were not corroded. 
Gasoline leakage from the broken pipe at the Gridley station 
occurred over a period of several months, during which large 
quantities of gasoline were released. The summary of records of 
gasoline loss was: 
November, 1985 485 gallons 
December, 1985 4,770 gallons 
January, 1986 4,742 gallons 
February, 198 6 1,877 gallons 
TOTAL 11,839 gallons 
(Transamerica Brief at 5) . From these records, the insured 
surmised that the initial break occurred in late November, 1985. 
The break was repaired in early February, 1986.5 (Gridley Brief at 
6.) 
A comparison of the facts in Gridley with the facts now before 
this Court illustrate that Defendants' position is untenable. 
5
 Relevant portions of Plaintiff/Appellee's brief in Gridley 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" (the "Gridley Brief"). 
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Although the final breach in the line at the Gridley station was 
apparently due to earth movement, the pipe which ruptured had been 
subject to the process of gradual corrosion. Had this pipe not 
been corroded, it, like the adjacent lines, would not have been 
ruptured by the hypothesized earth movement. It follows, 
therefore, that the line in question at the Gridley station was 
subjected to the same gradual processes of corrosion as the line at 
the LaSal Station. Had the line at the LaSal Station been 
subjected to some sort of earth movement which cracked the line in 
the same place where the corrosion occurred, and if this crack had 
occurred only one day prior to the day when the release of gasoline 
actually occurred, under Defendants' theory the release would have 
been "sudden and accidental," thereby falling within the exception 
to the pollution exclusion. 
The indefensibility of Defendants' position is further 
illustrated by comparing the quantities of gasoline released at the 
Gridley station and at the LaSal Station. It is undisputed that 
nearly 12,000 gallons of gasoline were lost during the two and one-
half month period prior to discovery of the leak at the Gridley 
station. The insured in Gridley, consequently, was on notice at 
least since the beginning of December, 1985, that it had a major 
leak. Nevertheless, the insured did not attempt to find and fix 
the leak until February, 1986. Under LaSal's insurers' theory, 
because the rupture in the Gridley line is characterized as a 
"clean break," the insured in Gridley falls within the exception to 
the pollution exclusion despite the fact that the insured had been 
on notice for several months regarding the presence of a leak and 
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regardless of the fact that nearly 12,000 gallons of gasoline were 
lost. In contrast, under Defendants' analysis, because the rupture 
at the LaSal Station is characterized as a "corrosive" leak, LaSal 
does not fall within the exception to the pollution exclusion even 
though it had no record of gasoline shortages prior to discovery of 
the leak, LaSal acted immediately to find and fix the leak as soon 
as there was evidence of a leak and gasoline losses were so minute 
they had not been detected. 
The flaw in the insurers' position is further illustrated by 
their attempt to distinguish Wagner v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co., 
427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis.Ct.App. 1988), review denied, 436 N.W.2d 30 
(Wis. 1988) from the case now before this Court. According to 
Defendants, Wagner, like Gridley, is distinguishable because the 
gasoline leak began "immediately" after an underground line was 
cracked in 1981. As noted by the Wagner court, the underlying 
facts were not well developed; accordingly, the amount of released 
gasoline is not found in the opinion. The leak was discovered 
approximately three years after the presumed initiation of the 
release when gasoline odors were detected on surrounding 
properties. Given these facts, although concededly not known, it 
is reasonable to assume that the initial volume of gasoline 
released from the cracked line was minuscule; hence, the failure to 
discover the pollution for some three years. It is likely, 
therefore, that the broken line in Wagner initially resulted in "a 
gradual drip or trickle." Gridley v. Transamerica, 828 P.2d at 
527. Thus, the distinction drawn in Gridley between a release from 
a "clean break," which the Gridley court apparently presumed 
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necessarily results in an initial release of large volumes of 
gasoline, and a release from a "corrosion break," which the court 
presumed to result in a "gradual drip or trickle," does not in fact 
exist. 
The likely scenario in Wagner is thus in sharp contrast to 
that in Gridlev despite the fact that both apparently involved 
clean breaks. In Gridley significant amounts of gasoline were 
initially lost within the first few months after the line ruptured, 
whereas initial losses in Wagner were apparently small. These 
factual differences between Wagner and Gridley with respect to 
total amounts released, rate of release and duration of release 
prior to discovery illustrate precisely why the cause of a rupture, 
the initial volume released, and the duration of the release are 
irrelevant to a determination as to whether the release was 
"sudden." 
B. The Proposition That "Gradual is the Opposite of Sudden" 
Is Both Incorrect and Irrelevant. 
LaSal's insurers contend that because "gradual is the opposite 
of sudden," any discharge from an underground gasoline line caused 
by corrosion of the pipe is gradual, not sudden. Although the 
juxtaposition of "gradual" and "sudden" is, on its face, clever, 
this is a false dichotomy.6 
According to this "gradual-versus-sudden" analysis, LaSal's 
reasoning leads to unacceptable results—at least in the view of 
6
 The term "gradual," of course, is found nowhere in the 
definition of "occurrence" or in the pollution exclusion of the CGL 
policies at issue. (See R. 2146 for the Omaha pollution exclusion 
and definition of "occurrence" and R. 2023, 2078 for the Carriers 
pollution exclusion.) 
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the insurers, the clear implication being that any such logical 
analysis will somehow upset the cosmic balance with inevitable 
tragic consequences. (Defendants' Brief at 18-19). Nevertheless, 
under any logical analysis of the "sudden and accidental" exception 
to the pollution exclusion it is incontestable that: (1) the length 
of time for the process (whatever that process may be) to create a 
rupture in a containment vessel from which pollutants are released 
is irrelevant as to whether the release is "sudden," (2) the volume 
of pollutants released is irrelevant as to whether the release is 
"sudden," (3) the duration of time between initiation of the leak 
and discovery of the leak is irrelevant as to whether the release 
is "sudden," and (4) whether the damages occur immediately after 
the release or gradually accrue over a period of time is irrelevant 
as to whether the release is "sudden." The sole pertinent inquiry 
is whether the release itself was "sudden." It therefore follows, 
as LaSal's insurers correctly observe, that an initial release from 
a containment vessel is always, as a matter of law, "sudden." The 
fact that this logical analysis leads to what the insurers contend 
is an "unacceptable" conclusion is the insurers's problem, not 
LaSal's. It is, after all, LaSal's insurers who drafted the 
pollution exclusion. 
The fact that unexpected and unintended releases from 
containment vessels may all be "sudden" does not mean that all 
releases of pollutants are "sudden and accidental," nor does it 
necessarily eliminate the temporal component from "sudden." As 
recognized by numerous courts, routine, day-to-day discharges of 
pollutants which are part of the insured's business operations are 
- 19 -
neither sudden nor accidental. See, e.g., Anaconda Minerals v. 
Stoller Chemical Co., 773 F.Supp. 1498 (D. Utah 1991), aff'd, 990 
F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. 
U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 675 F.Supp. 677 (D. Utah 1991), aff'd, 
962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992). Thus, the insurers' ominous 
prediction that LaSal's argument will eviscerate the meaning of 
"sudden" is a red herring. 
Controversy surrounding the interpretation of "sudden and 
accidental" has been exacerbated by decisions wherein the courts 
have used the word "gradual" imprecisely, thereby conflating 
separate, distinct notions: the process resulting in a rupture of 
a containment vessel, the initial discharge of pollutants from the 
vessel, the duration of the discharge and the damages resulting 
from the discharge of pollutants. 
The decision in ALC Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property 
and Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Cal.App.4th 1773, 22 Cal.Rptr. 206 
(1993), petition for review denied, Cal.Rptr. (Cal. 
1993) , cited by LaSal's insurers, exemplifies this problem. In ALC 
Technologies, the court failed to distinguish between pollution of 
the environment—which may be gradual—with the initiation and 
duration of a discharge. This confusion is illustrated by the 
following quotations: 
[The] "sudden and accidental" language in the CGL 
pollution exclusion does not allow for coverage for 
gradual pollution. 
Id. at 212 (emphasis added)(cited in Defendants' Brief at 21). 
[T]he release of contaminants was a result of holes in 
the tanks which developed over time as a result of rust. 
Corrosion is, by definition, a gradual process. 
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Id. at 219 (emphasis added). 
Similarly# in Shell Oil v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co. , 12 
Cal.App.4th 715, 15 Cal.Rptr. 2d 815 (1993) (cited by both LaSal 
and by the insurers) , the court at one point found that "sudden" 
refers to the commencement of a discharge. Id. at 841. 
Nevertheless, the Shell court stated that, 
If a sudden and accidental discharge continues for a long 
time, at some point it ceases to be sudden or accidental. 
. . Still, a sudden and accidental discharge of a 
dangerous pollutant could continue unabated for some 
period because of a negligent failure to discover it, 
technical problems or a lack of resources that delay 
curtailment, or some other circumstance. Liability from 
such an event could well be covered. 
15 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (citation omitted). 
It is clear that the Shell court struggled with the 
distinction between the initial discharge of pollutants and the 
possibility that the discharge might continue for a lengthy period 
of time. Thus, although the Shell court agreed with Lumbermens 
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 407 Mass. 675, 555 
N.E.2d 568, 572 n. 6 (1990), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 
S.Ct. 969 (1992) that "'sudden' refers to the pollution's 
commencement," the Shell court did not adequately come to grips 
with the problem of the duration of a release.7 
7
 The insurers attempt to distinguish three additional cases 
cited by LaSal: Goodman v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. , 412 
Mass. 807, 593 N.E.2d 233 (1992); Petr-All Petroleum Corp. v. 
Fireman's Ins. Co., 593 N.Y.S.2d 963 (N.Y.App.Div. 1993); and 
Colonie Motors, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 538 
N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y.App.Div. 1989). Without belaboring the points 
raised above in LaSal's discussion of ALC Technologies and Shell, 
LaSal merely notes that the decisions in Goodman, Petr-All and 
Colonie Motors lend further credence to LaSal's observation that 
courts have had considerable problems in dealing with the sudden 
and accidental exception to the pollution exclusion. The insurers' 
statement that "[t]he Goodman decision is consistent with Wagner 
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Under any logical analysis of the "sudden and accidental" 
exception to the pollution exclusion, it is inescapable that the 
salient inquiry is whether the release was "sudden." The insurance 
companies attempt to characterize the leak at the LaSal Station as 
gradual because the corrosive process leading up to the release was 
gradual is irrelevant. The volume of pollutants released, the 
duration of time until discovery of the leak and the damages caused 
by the leak are equally irrelevant to whether the release itself 
was "sudden and accidental." This Court should hold that the 
release of gasoline at the LaSal Station was "sudden and 
accidental." 
C. The Fact the Rupture in LaSal's Pipe Resulted From 
Corrosion is Irrelevant to Determining Whether the Leak 
Was "Sudden" 
The insurers contend that the inception of the leak at the 
LaSal Station occurred sometime between February, 1983 and 
September, 1984 (Defendants' Brief at 27-28). As pointed out by 
LaSal, supra at 2-4, EarthFax's calculations regarding the date of 
onset of the leak must be placed in context. EarthFax's conclusion 
that the onset of the leak occurred sometime between February, 198 3 
and September, 1984, is based entirely on the hypothetical 
presumption that all of the gasoline pollution in the Moab area 
came solely from the LaSal Station. Given the small size of the 
holes in LaSal's underground line and the fact that inventory 
and Gridley in differentiating between a gradually developing leak 
through corrosion and one which is abrupt and immediate" 
(Defendants' Brief at 25) underscores the analytical problem. It 
is not the leak which gradually develops through corrosion but, 
rather, the weakening of the pipe walls which gradually develops 
through corrosion. Once the leak begins, irrespective of the cause 
and the initial volume, it is sudden." 
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records for the month immediately preceding discovery of the leak 
indicated no loss of product, it is likely (as LaSal has always 
maintained) that the rupture occurred much more recently than 
September, 1984. 
As the insurers correctly point out, both LaSal and Omaha 
presented expert testimony from two metallurgists regarding the 
condition of the pipe segment which ruptured. Both Dr. Pitt and 
Dr. Alex agreed that the pipe segment had been subjected to general 
and pitting corrosion, the result of which was the thinning of the 
pipe wall at the base of the thread roots to the point where the 
pipe failed at these thinned areas (R. 3236, 3253). 
According to the testimony of Dr. Pitt, LaSal's expert, the 
release of gasoline at the LaSal Station was sudden: 
. . . The corrosion proceeded to continue until at some 
point in time the metal was thin enough to burst suddenly 
from the inside pressure of the pipe. And in my opinion 
that's what caused at least one of the holes present. 
Q: Okay. Now, you say that it burst suddenly through 
the pipe caused by the — you have a corroded pipe and 
you have pressure inside, and at some point because of 
that pressure the hole was burst through it and suddenly 
created in that pipe? 
A: Simply the metal is not strong enough to hold the 
interior pressure. 
Q: But prior to the failure, gasoline was moving through 
that pipe with no leakage? 
A: That's right. 
Q: (By Mr. Hansen) Do you have an opinion to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty as to whether 
or not, prior to the event that you just described, there 




Q: Okay. What is that opinion? 
A: My opinion was that there was no leak prior to the 
one that occurred at that time. 
A: If the pipe were not under pressure, I believe the 
leak would also have been sudden because at one instance 
it's there and in the next instance it's not. It's not 
there and then it's there. 
R. 3235-3238. 
Dr. Alex, the insurers' expert, further testified as follows: 
Q: Now, before there was a failure in that piece of 
pipe, before there was a failure, would it hold water or 
gasoline? 
A: Yes, it would. 
Q: And after the failure it wouldn't hold water or 
gasoline, right? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: And it is true, isn't it, that at one point in time 
that piece of pipe would hold gasoline? It was a good 
containment unit, right? 
A: That is correct. 
Q: And at some point in time it wasn't a good 
containment unit, right? 
A: That is correct. 
R. 3289. 
According to the testimony of both experts, at one moment in 
time, the underground gasoline line at the LaSal Station was intact 
and at the next moment, when a small opening appeared, it was not. 
Only one logical conclusion may be drawn from this testimony: if 
a containment vessel at one point in time has integrity, that is, 
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it is intact, and at the next moment its integrity is destroyed 
thereby releasing pollutants, the event in question can only be 
characterized as "sudden." One can only conclude that the release 
at the LaSal Station was "sudden." 
CONCLUSION 
The release of gasoline at the LaSal Station falls within the 
exception to the pollution exclusion irrespective of whether the 
term "sudden" is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation or whether the term "sudden" is found to have a 
temporal component. If the phrase "sudden and accidental" means 
"unintended or unexpected," the release of gasoline at the LaSal 
Station was accidental and was neither intended nor expected. 
Because the language in question is reasonably susceptible to more 
than one interpretation, it must be construed against Omaha and 
Carriers and in favor of LaSal to provide coverage for the release 
of gasoline. Alternatively, if the term "sudden" is deemed to have 
a temporal component, it is undisputed that the initial discharge 
of gasoline occurred immediately or "suddenly." It is irrelevant 
that the process whereby the initial fracture appeared was caused 
by erosion; similarly the length of time which elapsed between 
discovery of the discharge, the volume of the discharge, the rate 
of discharge and the time which elapsed for the discharge to 
contaminate the environment are irrelevant as to whether the 
release itself was "sudden and accidental." Accordingly, the 
gasoline release falls within the "sudden and accidental" exception 
to the pollution exclusion. This Court must hold that both Omaha 
and Carriers have a duty to defend and to indemnify LaSal in the 
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actions brought against it by the State of Utah and by Hartford 
Leasing Corporation. 
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I. JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in the 
present case pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Section 78-2a-3 
(1953, as amended). 
II. ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
The issue presented on appeal is whether the gradual 
damage caused by a gasoline line leak is barred from 
coverage by the pollution exclusion contained in an 
insurance policy issued to Plaintiffs and Appellees 
Gridley Associates, Ltd., Petroleum Management, Inc., and 
Vernon G. W. Dickman (hereinafter "Gridley Associates11) 
by Defendants and Appellant Transamerica Insurance 
Company (hereinafter "Transamerica11) . There are no 
issues of material fact disputed by the parties. 
III. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Transamerica seeks a review of the entry of partial 
summary judgment by the trial court below. Under the 
standard of review for conclusions of law, the Court of 
Appeals should accord the trial court's conclusions "no 
particular deference, but review them for correctness." 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
IV. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
or regulations are determinative of this appeal. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from an insurance coverage 
dispute between Transamerica and Gridley Associates. 
Gridley Associates filed the instant action seeking 
insurance coverage from Transamerica for liability they 
faced arising from a gasoline leak. Transamerica then 
filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking 
judgment on Gridley Associates' Claims for Relief for 
breach of contract and declaratory relief. The only 
issue raised in Transamerica's motion was that the 
pollution exclusion in its policy precluded coverage of 
Gridley's claim. (Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit A in 
the Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, page 3, 
paragraph 7; Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibit 
B in the Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, 
Motion pages 1-2). The trial court, basing its ruling 
upon undisputed facts, held the leak was "sudden and 
accidental" under its interpretation of those terms and 
accordingly denied Transamerica's Motion. (Affidavit of 
Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the Addendum filed concurrently 
with this brief, page 4, paragraph 9; Minute Order, 
Exhibit C in the Addendum filed concurrently with this 
brief.) 
In response to the trial court's ruling, the parties 
entered into a Settlement Agreement and Release whereby 
Transamerica agreed to pay a certain sum toward cleanup 
of the site of the leak, while Gridley Associates agreed 
to dismiss their causes of action for bad faith, fraud, 
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and negligent misrepresentation. The Agreement also 
provided that in the event the agreed-upon sum was 
insufficient to pay for the cleanup, Transamerica would 
have the option of notifying Gridley Associates of its 
intent to appeal the trial court's ruling on the 
pollution exclusion. (Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit 
A in the Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, 
page 5, paragraphs 10-11; Settlement Agreement and 
Release, Exhibit D in the Addendum filed concurrently 
with this brief, page 7, paragraph 3.) This provision 
came into effect upon Transamerica's payment of the full 
agreed amount, and Transamerica exercised its option, 
notifying Gridley Associates that it intended to appeal 
the ruling. To place the action in a posture from which 
it could be appealed, the parties stipulated to a Partial 
Summary Judgment, entered by the trial court on December 
13, 1990. Specifically, the parties stipulated to entry 
of judgment in Gridley Associate's favor as to the two 
Claims for Relief for breach of contract and declaratory 
relief. (Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the 
Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, pages 5-6, 
paragraph 12; Record at 593-94, Stipulation; Record at 
595-97, Partial Summary Judgment.) The Partial Summary 
Judgment is a final order, entry of which disposed of the 
case. Transamerica now appeals from that Judgment as 
planned. 
The undisputed facts pertinent to this appeal are 
essentially as set out in Transamerica's Motion for 
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Partial Summary Judgment. For all relevant time periods, 
Gridley Associates owned a self-service gasoline station 
in Gridley, California ("the Gridley station"). (Record 
at 200, paragraph 9, Amended Complaint.) From February 
7, 1985 through March 7, 1986, the Gridley station was 
covered by a policy of insurance issued by Transamerica 
("the Policy"). (Record at 199-200, paragraphs 6-7, 
Amended Complaint; Record at 342, paragraph 3, Affidavit 
of Michael Dean ["Dean affidavit"].) The Policy provided 
coverage for liability arising from injuries to third 
persons in three different sections: (a) Section II — 
Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL") (schedule B), (b) 
Section III — Garage Insurance (schedule F), and (c) 
Section V — Commercial Umbrella Policy Declaration. 
(Record at 342, paragraph 4, Dean affidavit.) With 
respect to the CGL and Commercial Umbrella coverages, the 
Policy contained the following exclusion: 
This insurance does not apply: 
to bodily injury or property damage 
arising out of the discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape of 
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, 
alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or 
gasses, waste materials or other 
irritants, contaminants or 
pollutants into or upon the land, 
the atmosphere or any water course 
or body of water; but this exclusion 
does not apply if such discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape is 
sudden and accidental. 
(Record at 342, paragraph 5, Dean affidavit.) 
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With respect to the Garage Insurance, the Policy 
contained the following exclusion: 
This insurance does not apply to: 
• • • 
Bodily injury or property damage 
caused by the dumping, discharge or 
escape of irritants, pollutants or 
contaminants. This exclusion does 
not apply if the discharge is sudden 
and accidental. 
(Record at 343, paragraph 6, Dean affidavit.) This 
quoted language together with that quoted above from the 
CGL and Commercial Umbrella coverages are hereinafter 
referred to collectively as "the pollution exclusion." 
For the months of November 1985 through February 
1986, the Gridley station recorded the following 
shortfalls between the volume of regular leaded gasoline 
purchased and placed in its underground storage tank and 
the volume of such gasoline actually sold: 
November 1985 485 gallons 
December 1985 4,770 gallons 
January 1986 4,742 gallons 
February 1986 1.877 gallons 
TOTAL 11,839 gallons 
(Plaintiffs' Answers and Objections to Defendant's Second 
Set of Interrogatories, Exhibit E in the Addendum filed 
concurrently with this brief, pages 6-7, No. 9, and Tank 
Inventory Summary attached thereto.) 
In early February, 1986, Gridley Associates engaged 
Dockendorf Equipment Co. ("Dockendorf") to locate any 
leak in the regular leaded fuel system at the Gridley 
station that would account for the shortfalls. 
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(Deposition of Calvin Clifton Bolley, Exhibit F in the 
Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, page 7.) 
Dockendorf proceeded to test the regular leaded fuel 
system at the Gridley station. Dockendorf determined 
that gasoline had leaked from a pipe connecting a 
gasoline storage tank and submerged pump with the 
gasoline dispensers. (Deposition of Billy Gene Hankins 
["Hankins deposition"], Exhibit G in the Addendum filed 
concurrently with this brief, pages 8, 38-39, 47-48.) 
The leak occurred in a section of the pipe which had been 
weakened by the gradual process of electrolysis. 
(Hankins deposition, Exhibit G in the Addendum filed 
concurrently with this brief, pages 49-52.) Gasoline 
would flow out of the leaking area of the pipe only when 
the fuel system was activated to pump gasoline thereby 
putting pressure on the line. The leakage would stop 
when the pump was not activated and pressure was taken 
off the gasoline line. (Hankins deposition, Exhibit G in 
the Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, pages 
10-11.) On or about February 12, 1986, Dockendorf 
repaired the leak in the gasoline line at the Gridley 
station. (Hankins deposition, Exhibit G in the Addendum 
filed concurrently with this brief, page 6.) 
In March, 1986, large quantities of gasoline were 
discovered on property adjacent to the Gridley station. 
(Record at 201, paragraph 10, Amended Complaint.) 
Gridley Associates were ordered by governmental agencies 
to clean up the gasoline on the adjacent property. They 
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undertook to do so by hiring America Environmental 
Management Corporation. (Record at 201, paragraph 11, 
Amended Complaint.) The City of Gridley and Nevada 
Construction & Mining filed actions against plaintiffs 
Vernon G. W. Dickman and Gridley Associates, Ltd., to 
recover damages allegedly caused by the gasoline leakage. 
These actions have been settled. (Record at 202, 
paragraph 15, Amended Complaint; Plaintiffs' Answers and 
Objections to Defendant's Second Set of Interrogatories, 
Exhibit E in the Addendum filed concurrently with this 
brief, 1-2, No. 1(2)). 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The sole issue facing the Court of Appeals is the 
interpretation of the pollution exclusion's "sudden and 
accidental" language. Although Gridley Associates have 
indicated that they intend to argue that Transamerica is 
estopped from raising the pollution exclusion as a ground 
for coverage, that is not an issue in this appeal. The 
trial court below ruled solely on the issue of the 
pollution exclusion based on undisputed facts. In order 
for the Court to consider the issue of estoppel, it would 
have to act as a fact finder, which is clearly outside 
its appropriate role. 
The Court should adopt an interpretation of the 
pollution exclusion which precludes coverage of the 
subject claim. To say what we all know, namely, 
nxsudden' means %sudden,'" is not meant to be funny but 
rather is meant to point out that the plain meaning is 
obvious. A "plain meaning" approach to interpreting the 
insurance policy at issue is appropriate under Utah 
principals of contract interpretation. The plain meaning 
of the phrase "sudden and accidental" includes a temporal 
element, requiring that the discharge of pollutants, 
rather than the cause of the discharge or the resulting 
damage, happen abruptly. Where contaminants are 
discharged on a continual, intermittent basis in the 
course of regular business, as in the present case, such 
discharge is plainly not "sudden." Certainly such facts 
do not succeed in carrying the insured's burden of 
proving that the discharge was "sudden and accidental." 
Moreover, by so interpreting the exclusion, the 
Court would be in keeping with the rule of construction 
that all parts of a contract should be given effect where 
possible. If the word "sudden" is interpreted as 
synonymous with "accidental," then it becomes meaningless 
surplusage in the phrase "sudden and accidental." 
Such an interpretation of the pollution exclusion is 
supported by the holdings of the majority of courts 
across the country, particularly the more recent of such 
holdings. No appellate court has ruled on this issue in 
Utah. A federal district court sitting in Utah, however, 
has recently addressed this issue and has ruled in 
accordance with the interpretation proposed by 
Transamerica. Although this case has no precedential 
value, it does show a trend toward the proper 
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interpretation of the pollution exclusion, particularly 
in Utah. The Court of Appeals should adopt reasoning 
similar to that of all these cases and rule that the leak 
at the Gridley station is not covered by the Policy. 
VII. ARGUMENT 
A. The Leakage at the Gridlev Station Was Not a 
"Sudden Discharge" and Thus Is Not Covered 
Under the Policy. 
The relevant facts regarding the leak at the Gridley 
station are not in dispute. The loss claimed resulted 
from the intermittent discharge of gasoline into the 
ground in the vicinity of the Gridley station over a 
period of approximately four months. Further, for 
purposes of this appeal, Transamerica does not dispute 
that the alleged loss was an "occurrence" under the 
Policy or that the discharge was "accidental." 
Similarly, Plaintiffs must concede that the gasoline leak 
at the Gridley station falls within the terms of the 
pollution exclusion absent application of the conditional 
language regarding a "sudden and accidental" discharge. 
The simple issue before the Court is whether the leak at 
the Gridley station was a "sudden discharge." 
1. The Court Should Use a Plain Meaning 
Approach to Interpret the Terms of the 
Policy. 
As the relevant facts are undisputed, the issue of 
whether the leak at the Gridley station was a "sudden 
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discharge" is one of contract interpretation for the 
Court. See Saunders v. Sharp. 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). 
In determining the meaning of "sudden," the Court should 
be guided by general principles of interpretation 
recognized by Utah courts. As stated by Utah's Supreme 
Court, "[u]nless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty 
in the language of an insurance policy, the policy should 
be enforced according to its terms." St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Insurance v. Commercial Union Assurance. 606 P.2d 
1206, 1208 (Utah 1980) (footnote deleted). That court 
has also held that "all of [a contract's] parts should be 
given effect insofar as that is possible." Larrabee v. 
Roval Dairy Products Co.. 614 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah 1980). 
See also Marriott v. Pacific National Life Assurance Co.. 
24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981 (1970). Most importantly, 
policy language should be given "its usual and ordinary 
meaning." Fire Insurance Exchange v. Alsop. 709 P.2d 
389, 390 (Utah 1985). As the Utah Supreme Court stated 
in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Dennis. 645 P.2d 
672, 675 (Utah 1982) quoting from Jamestown Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 266 
N.C. 430, 146 S.E.2d 410, 416 (1966): 
In the construction of 
contracts, even more than in the 
construction of statutes, words 
which are used in common, daily, 
non-technical speech, should, in the 
absence of evidence of a contrary 
intent, be given the meaning which 
they have for laymen in such daily 
usage, rather than a restrictive 
meaning which they may have acquired 
in legal usage. 
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See also Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 
1047 (Utah 1985) ("words are to be given their ordinary 
meaning11). 
2. The Pollution Exclusion Precludes 
Coverage of Non-Sudden Discharges of 
Pollutants. 
The pollution exclusion contains two basic 
provisions: (1) an exclusion from coverage of all claims 
arising out of the "discharge, dispersal, release or 
escape" of pollutants of any kind; and (2) a narrow 
exception to the exclusion that preserves coverage only 
where such polluting discharges (not the damage or injury 
resulting from such discharges) are both "sudden" and 
"accidental." The language of the pollution exclusion is 
simple and straightforward, and leaves no room for any 
suggestion of "ambiguity." Moreover, when the exclusion 
is read in the context of the entire policy, there can be 
no question as to its meaning and effect. If a claim 
arises out of the discharge^ of waste materials or 
contaminants, it falls within the ambit of the pollution 
exclusion and is excluded from coverage unless the 
exception to the exclusion applies. As noted, that 
exception provides that 
this exclusion does not apply if 
such discharge[, dispersal, release 
or escape] is sudden and accidental. 
To show that such a claim falls within the exception to 
the pollution exclusion, therefore, an insured must show 
both that the relevant discharge was accidental and that 
it also occurred suddenly. 
Transamerica's position on the meaning of the 
pollution exclusion is that the word "sudden" describes 
an abrupt, brief, instantaneous discharge. This 
definition has been adopted by numerous courts that have 
analyzed the meaning of the word "sudden" in the 
pollution exclusion language now before this Court. 
Granted, some early decisions viewed "sudden" to be 
ambiguous, construing it against the insurer to find 
coverage. Others, finding no ambiguity, equated "sudden" 
with "unexpected" or "unintended" thus making it 
synonymous with "accidental."1 However, in recent years, 
the majority of decisions have held that the word 
"sudden" as used in the pollution exclusion is neither 
ambiguous nor superfluous.2 It is this authority which 
Transamerica asks the Court to follow. 
*A helpful summary of these two lines of authority 
is set forth in International Minerals & Chemical Corp. 
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 168 111. App. 3d 361, 
522 N.E.2d 758, 765-66 cert, denied. 122 111. 2d 576, 530 
N.E.2d 246 (1988)• 
^his trend is recognized and discussed in Fireman's 
Fund Insurance Co. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp.. 702 F. Supp. 1317, 
1326 (E.D. Mich. 1988). A comprehensive list of current 
case law on the pollution exclusion is attached as 
Exhibit H hereto. 
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a. The Exception to the Pollution 
Exclusion Applies to the Discharge 
of Pollutants. 
The terms "sudden and accidental" clearly describe 
the discharge of pollutants rather than the cause of such 
a discharge or the damage experienced. This is in 
contrast to the "occurrence" requirement which states 
that the damage must be neither expected nor intended. 
In a well-reasoned decision by the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts, the court discusses this distinction as 
follows: 
The sudden event to which the 
exception in the pollution exclusion 
clause applies concerns neither the cause 
of the release of a pollutant nor the 
damage caused by the release. It is the 
release of pollutants itself that must 
have occurred suddenly, if the exception 
is to apply so as to provide coverage. 
The exception thus focuses on the 
circumstances of the release. In 
deciding whether there was an occurrence, 
on the other hand, the focus of the 
inquiry is on the property damage, asking 
whether it was expected or intended from 
the insured's point of view. Courts that 
have failed to appreciate this 
distinction have led themselves to 
identify an ambiguity in the policy 
language that does not exist. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville Industries, Inc., 
407 Mass. 675, 679, 555 N.E.2d 568, 571 (1990). See also 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals. Inc.. 
856 F.2d 31 (1988) ("It must also be emphasized that the 
focus of this * sudden and accidental' exception to the 
general pollution exclusion clause is on the nature of 
the discharge of the pollution itself, not on the nature 
of the damages caused"); Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies v. 
Ex-Cell-0 Corp.. supra. 702 F. Supp. at 1326-27 (E.D. 
Mich. 1988) ("The focus of the pollution exclusion is on 
the discharge or release of pollutants into the 
environment. When the discharge or release of a 
pollutant is brief or lasts only a short time, it comes 
within the meaning of the first element of the *sudden 
and accidental' exception of the pollution exclusion."); 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 
693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (damage caused by a 
"gradual release/1 etc., is excluded), aff'd. 875 F.2d 
868 (6th Cir. 1989); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes. 77 
Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 212 (1985), review denied. 301 Or. 
76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986) (the pollution exclusion focuses 
upon the discharge of pollutants, not upon the resulting 
damage or injury); Waste Management of Carolinas. Inc. v. 
Peerless Ins. Co.. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374 (the 
pollution exclusion precludes any coverage obligation 
where discharges had occurred repeatedly "over the course 
of time," focusing upon the polluting event itself — the 
discharge of pollutants — rather than on any resulting 
injury or damage or its cause), reh'g denied. 316 N.C. 
386, 346 S.E.2d 134 (1986). 
b. The Term "Sudden" Means the Opposite 
of "Gradual". 
Some courts claim that the word "sudden" within the 
exception is itself ambiguous. The plain, common, daily, 
non-technical meaning of "sudden" is not ambiguous. In 
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"daily usage,M "sudden" denotes an abrupt or precipitous 
event. As the Sixth Circuit stated in USF&G v. Star Fire 
Coals, supra. 856 F.2d at 34 (6th Cir. 1988): 
We do not find the pollution 
clause to be riddled with 
ambiguities despite the best efforts 
. . . to create them. • • . 
We believe the everyday meaning 
of the term "sudden" is exactly what 
this clause means. We do not 
believe that it is possible to 
define "sudden" without reference to 
a temporal element that joins 
together conceptually the immediate 
and the unexpected. 
That court recently reiterated its understanding of the 
term "sudden" in FL Aerospace v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 
897 F.2d 214, cert, denied. U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 283, 
112 L.Ed.2d 238 (1990). The court held that the plain, 
everyday meaning of "sudden" is "happening . . . quickly, 
without warning, unexpectedly; abrupt." Id. at 219. 
Accordingly, "a sudden and accidental event is one that 
happens quickly, without warning, and fortuitously or 
unintentionally." Id. Accord Grant-Southern Iron & 
Metal Co. v. CNA Ins. Co.. 905 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1990). 
A federal court sitting in another Tenth Circuit 
state has recently come to a similar conclusion. It 
held: 
As commonly used, the meaning of 
"sudden" combines both the elements 
of without notice or warning and 
quick or brief in time. . . 
Sudden connotes "a temporal aspect 
of immediacy, abruptness, swiftness, 
quickness, instantaneousness, and 
brevity." 
United States Fid, & Guar, Co, v. Morrison Grain Co.. 734 
F. Supp. 437, 446 (D. Kan. 1990) (citing C, L, Hauthavav 
& Sons v. American Motorists Ins,, 712 F. Supp. 265, 268 
(D. Mass. 1989)). 
The court in International Minerals. supra, 522 
N.E.2d at 769 (111. 1988), explained this temporal 
requirement even more fully, holding as follows: 
••[Sadden11 is understood in its 
ordinary, most common and popular 
sense, to have a temporal 
significance. Webster's dictionary 
defines "sudden" as "happening 
without previous notice or with very 
brief notice; " "abrupt" ; 
"characterized by and manifesting 
hastiness"; (Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, 2284 
(1976)); and we decline to ignore 
these temporal-focused definitions 
or hold that because the word might 
also have other contextual uses, it 
is ambiguous and thus must be 
interpreted to provide coverage 
where the policy language read as a 
whole clearly intends to exclude 
such coverage. 
The Ex-Cell-0 court similarly declared: "*[S]udden' in 
the pollution exclusion includes the temporal component 
of briefness, and means *brief, momentary, or lasting 
only a short time.' *Sudden' is to be contrasted with 
*gradual.'" 702 F. Supp. at 1326 (footnote omitted). 
The Second Circuit court has also very recently 
adopted this plain meaning of "sudden." Rejecting the 
insureds' argument that the "sudden and accidental" 
exception should be interpreted to mean "unexpected and 
unintended," the court held that "[f]or a release or 
discharge to be sudden, it must * occur [] over a short 
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period of time.'11 Oaden Corp, v. Travelers Indem. Co., 
924 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Technicon 
Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assur. Co. . 141 A.D.2d 
124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 74 
N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (1989)). A 
district court in this circuit has similarly held in a 
recent opinion that "the word * sudden/ implies a temporal 
element. Thus an event which lasts for an extended period 
of time is not xsudden.'•• Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of 
North America. No. 84 Civ. 1968, slip op. at 13 (S.D.N.Y. 
April 23, 1991) (available on Westlaw at 1991 WL 63420). 
The court further recognized that such an interpretation 
••is in keeping with the emerging majority view among the 
courts." Id. 
In American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host 
Corp.. 667 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Kan. 1987) , motion to vacate 
denied. 120 F.R.D. 129 (D. Kan. 1988), aff'd. No. 88-1053 
(10th Cir. March 21, 1991), the insured cited cases in 
support of the contention that the pollution exclusion 
was "ambiguous.M After reviewing these authorities, the 
court wrote: 
The Court has carefully 
considered these and similar cases, 
yet cannot conclude that the 
pollution exclusion clause is 
ambiguous. The language is clear 
and plain, something only a lawyer's 
ingenuity could make ambiguous. 
Id. at 1429. 
The General Host court went on to summarize the 
interplay between the definition of "occurrence" in the 
policies and the pollution exclusion itself: 
The contract is clear: 
"occurrences," as def ined, are 
covered unless the occurrences arise 
out of pollution events; those are 
not covered unless such pollution 
events are sudden and accidental. 
Read as a whole, the policy covers 
"continued and repeated exposures" 
except for exposures to pollution; 
then it covers only "sudden and 
accidental" events. The Court 
declines to contort the plain 
language of the policy. 
Id. (emphasis in original). Accord Olin, supra, No. 84 
Civ. 1968, slip op. at 8. Declining the insured's 
invitation to "contort the plain language of the policy," 
the General Host court applied the "clear and plain" 
terms of the pollution exclusion, and held that the word 
"sudden" is "objective" and requires that, to be covered, 
the polluting discharge must occur "on brief notice" and 
not "gradually or over an extended time." Id. at 1428. 
See also Waste Management v. Peerless, supra, 315 N.C. at 
699, 340 S.E.2d at 382 (1986) ("[t]he exception also 
describes the event — not only in terms of its being 
unexpected, but in terms of its happening instantaneously 
or precipitantly"); Lower Paxton Township v. United 
States Fid. & Guar. Co. , 383 Pa. Super. 558, 577, 557 
A.2d 393, 402 (1989) ("[t]o read ^sudden and accidental' 
to mean only unexpected and unintended is to rewrite the 
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policy by excluding one important pollution coverage 
requirement — abruptness of the pollution discharge").3 
c. The Term "Sudden" is Not 
Superfluous. 
To read "sudden" to mean only "unexpected" or 
"unforeseen" would violate the maxim that every part of 
a contract be given effect. See Larrabee, supra. 614 
P.2d 160 (Utah 1980). As the court in International 
Minerals. supra. 522 N.E.2d at 769 (111. 1988), observed: 
[IInterpreting "sudden" as 
"unintended and unexpected" renders 
it synonymous with "accidental," as 
that term is employed in the policy 
and thus, the word "accidental" can 
be read out of the exception as 
nothing more than redundant 
surplusage. Such a reading does not 
comport with fundamental rules of 
contract construction requiring that 
to the extent possible, all words 
used in a contract be given effect. 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts agreed with this 
reasoning, stating that: 
For the word "sudden" to have any 
significant purpose, and not to be 
surplusage when used generally in 
conjunction with the word "accidental," 
3The history of the pollution exclusion underscores 
that the term "sudden" was used in the exception to the 
exclusion precisely to differentiate abrupt, isolated 
discharges of pollutants, for which coverage might exist, 
from those that occurred continuously or repeatedly over 
a period of time, and for which coverage was excluded. 
See generally Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause 
Through the Looking Glass. 74 Geo. L.J. 1237 (1986) . The 
EPA itself acknowledges the distinction. In pollution 
insurance regulations promulgated under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §S 6921 et seq., 
the EPA has thus defined the term "sudden accidental 
occurrence" as "a[] [polluting event] which is not 
continuous or repeated in nature." 40 C.F.R. 
S 265.141(g) (emphasis added). 
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it must have a temporal aspect to its 
meaning, and not just the sense of 
something unexpected. We hold, 
therefore, that when used in describing a 
release of pollutants, "sudden" in 
conjunction with "accidental" has a 
temporal element. The issue is whether 
the release was sudden. The alternative 
is that it was gradual. 
. . . If the word "sudden" is to 
have any meaning or value in the 
exception to the pollution exclusion 
clause, only an abrupt discharge or 
release of pollutants falls within the 
exception. 
Lumbermens v. Belleville, supra, 407 Mass. at 679-81, 555 
N.E.2d at 571-72 (1990). See also Great Lakes Container 
Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.. 727 F.2d 30 (1st 
Cir. 1984) (words "sudden11 and "accidental" have plain, 
discrete, and readily ascertainable meanings, rejecting 
the argument of ambiguity); Technicon v. American Home. 
supra, 141 A.D.2d at 533, N.Y.S.2d at 97 (1988) ("a 
discharge of toxic waste could take place accidentally 
over an extended period of time but . . . there would be 
no coverage since the discharge was not *sudden'"); 
Techallov Co, v. Reliance Insurance Co.. 338 Pa. Super. 
1, 487 A.2d 820, 826-27 (1984) ("the language of the 
policy unambiguously states that there will be no 
coverage for toxic discharge into the environment unless 
that discharge is both sudden and accidental"); Lower 
Paxton v. USF&G. supra, 393 Pa. Super, at 577, 557 A.2d 
at 402 (1989) ("Reading *sudden' in its context, i.e. 
joined by the word *and' to the word * accident', the 
inescapable conclusion is that *sudden', even if 
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including the concept of unexpectedness, also adds an 
additional element because *unexpectedness' is already 
expressed by *accident'. This additional element is the 
temporal meaning of sudden, i.e. abruptness or brevity") . 
The cases discussed above are only some of the most 
recent to reject the "ambiguity"/"superfluousness" 
arguments and to give effect to the pollution exclusion 
in cases of repeated or continuous discharges of wastes. 
Other courts similarly have concluded that the pollution 
exclusion means what it says, and that it excludes 
coverage except in those cases where polluting discharges 
were truly "sudden" as well as "accidental." See, e.g., 
Borden Inc. v. Affiliated F.M. Insurance Co.. 682 F. 
Supp. 927, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (pollution exclusion "is 
clear and should not be twisted simply to provide 
insurance coverage when the courts deem it desirable"), 
aff'd. 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989), cert, denied. 
U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 68, 107 L.Ed.2d 35 (1989); Becker 
Electronics Mfg. Corp. v. Granite State Ins. Co.. No. 86-
CV-1294 (N.D.N.Y. June 12, 1989) (available on Westlaw at 
1989 WL 63671) (citing New York v. Amro Realty Corp. . 697 
F. Supp. 99 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) for unambiguous reading of 
"sudden and accidental" such that "sudden" means 
happening on very brief notice whereas "accidental" means 
happening unexpectedly). These views are, of course, in 
accord with black-letter Utah law providing that courts 
should not strain to create an ambiguity where none 
exists. See, e.g.. Overson v. United States Fidelity & 
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Guaranty Co. , 587 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978). Those courts 
following this rule have had no trouble understanding and 
applying the simple language of the exclusion. 
3. A Federal Court Sitting in Utah Has Very 
Recently Agreed With Transamerica/s 
Interpretation of the Pollution 
Exclusion. 
On February 28, 1991, the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, issued 
its opinion in Hartford Ace. & Indem. Corp. v. United 
States Fid. & Guar. Co., No. 88-C-1051J (available at 5 
Mealey's Lit. Rep., Insurance (Mealey) No. 18, 3/12/91, 
at B-l). In a coverage dispute between Hartford and its 
insured, the coxirt granted summary judgment for Hartford 
on the basis of the pollution exclusion. In agreement 
with the arguments presented herein, the court noted 
that: 
The courts adopting the plain 
and simple definition of sudden and 
accidental have uniformly found the 
regular and repeated- discharge of 
waste to be excluded from coverage 
by the pollution exclusion. . . . 
Likewise, this court finds that 
[the insured's] continuous and 
routine discharge of pollutants upon 
or into the ground cannot be 
construed as sudden and accidental. 
Id. at 7, 5 Mealey's No. 18 at B-4. In reaching this 
conclusion, 
the court emphasize[d] that the 
focus of the sudden and accidental 
exclusion clearly related to the 
nature of the "discharge, dispersal, 
release or escape" of the pollution 
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itself, not to the nature of the 
damages caused. [The insured's] 
claim that the damages were sudden 
and accidental mischaracterizes the 
relevant question before the court. 
The focus of the pollution 
exclusion, by its plain terms, is on 
the polluting discharges. If the 
discharge is not sudden and 
accidental, the exclusion is 
applicable and the resultant injury 
or damage is not within policy 
coverage. 
Id. at 8, 5 Mealey's No. 18 at B-4. The court directly 
disagreed with any argument that the "sudden and 
accidental" language was ambiguous. The court cited Star 
Fire Coals, supra, 856 F.2d at 34, for the contention 
that that language "is clear and plain, something only a 
lawyer's ingenuity could make ambiguous. . . . It's 
strange logic to perceive ambiguity in this clause." 
Hartford at 9. While the Hartford case holds no 
precedential value in the instant action, in the absence 
of any Utah state appellate authority regarding the 
interpretation of the pollution exclusion, this Court 
should consider the Hartford case persuasive authority 
and should follow the rule cited therein. 
By following the Hartford case, the Court of Appeals 
would join the swelling ranks of those courts performing 
a genuine interpretation of the policy language before 
them. Transamerica urges the Court of Appeals to follow 
this line of reasoning, accepting at face value the plain 
and clear language of the policy at issue. 
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4. The Pollution Exclusion Bars the Instant 
Claim. 
The loss for which Gridley Associates seek recovery 
resulted from a discharge of gasoline that was not 
"sudden." Over a period of four months, from pipe at the 
Gridley station which had suffered denigration caused by 
the electrolytic process, fuel leaked into the soil 
surrounding the Gridley station as the gasoline pump was 
activated. (See supra pages [4-5]) . It was not any one 
of these minor discharges, standing alone, that caused 
injury to the adjacent property. Rather, it was the 
cumulative effect of countless such periodic discharges 
that produced the contamination and accompanying 
liability for which Gridley Associates insist 
Transamerica must answer. However, this loss did not 
result from a "sudden discharge" as those words are 
commonly used. The leak occurred every time the pump was 
activated, and stopped every time the pump was turned 
off. 
The pollution at the Gridley station occurred over 
the course of several months as part of Gridley 
Associates' business operations. As such, the discharge 
of pollutants was not "sudden and accidental" as required 
for coverage. In fact, in Industrial Indem. Ins. v. 
Crown Auto Dealerships, 731 F. Supp. 1517 (M.D. Fla. 
1990), the court found that the pollution at issue, which 
was very similar to the pollution at the Gridley station, 
had occurred gradually and as a normal result of the 
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insured's business operations. The insured in that case 
had presented evidence that: 
a number of accidental 
overflows occurred during the 
filling of the used oil holding 
tanks, some of which resulted in 
fairly large spills. . . . There 
were also occasional spills due to 
leak hose and pipe connections. . . 
Also despite our efforts to 
impress on our employees the need 
for safety at all times, occasional 
carelessness by employees resulted 
in accidental spills during the 
transfer of used oil from trucks to 
storage tanks. 
Id. at 1521. In upholding the pollution exclusion, the 
court held that: 
. . . [t]hese spills and leaks 
appear to be common place events 
which occurred in the course of 
daily business, and therefore 
cannot, as a matter of law, be 
classified as "sudden and 
accidental." That is, these 
"occasional accidental spills" are 
recurring events that took place in 
the usual course of [business]. 
Id. 
Moreover, although the insurer nominally bears the 
burden of showing that the exclusionary language in the 
pollution exclusion is applicable, the exception to the 
exclusion is in substance a grant of coverage, and the 
insured thus bears the burden of proving that exception. 
Courts have so held specifically with respect to the 
insured's burden to prove the "sudden and accidental" 
exception in the pollution exclusion. Fischer & Porter 
Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.. 656 F. Supp. 132, 140 
(E.D. Pa. 1986). See also Cooper Dev. Co. v. Employers 
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Ins. of Wausau, No. C901330SC, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Cal. 
April 16, 1991) (available at 5 Mealey's Lit. Rep., 
Insurance (Mealey) No. 24, 4/23/91, at E-l, E-2) ; Detrex 
Chemical Industries. Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 
746 F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Northern Ins. 
Co. v. Aardvark Associates, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. 
Pa. 1990); Covenant Ins. Co. v. Friday Engineering Co.. 
742 F. Supp. 708 (D. Mass. 1990); A. Johnson & Co. , Inc. 
v. The Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 741 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 
1990), affid# No. 90-1753 (1st Cir., May 14, 1991); 
Fireman/s Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., supra, 702 
F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Mich. 1988), motion for rehearing 
denied, 720 F. Supp. 597 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Bora-Warner 
Corporation v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 88-539 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. February 1, 1991); 19 Couch on Insurance, 
Section 79:385 (2d Ed. 1983). Accordingly, Gridley 
Associates bears the burden of proving that the discharge 
of fuel was both "sudden" and "accidental" so that the 
exception to the exclusion comes into play. In other 
words, the main body of the pollution exclusion clearly 
applies to this claim. The damage at issue arises out of 
the discharge of pollutants; Transamerica has shown this 
without dispute from Gridley Associates. Transamerica 
has therefore met its burden of proof, and this burden 
has now shifted to Gridley Associates. The pollution 
exclusion applies unless Gridley Associates can convince 
the court that the facts lift this claim out of the 
exclusion. 
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As explained above, the facts presented do not meet 
this burden. The only facts regarding the discharge of 
fuel show that the release of contaminants at the Gridley 
station occurred over a number of months. No evidence 
exists that the fuel was release in a sudden episode. In 
the normal course of Gridley Associates' business 
operations, customers on innumerable occasions activated 
the gasoline pumps to dispense fuel. Time after time, on 
a daily basis, gasoline ran through the system, gradually 
leaking out bit by bit through the leak in the pipe into 
the surrounding soil. 
This is the Industrial Indemnity case. A continuous 
series of releases, even if one in isolation may be 
considered sudden, becomes not sudden, i.e., gradual, and 
excluded. Inventory records kept by the insured 
certainly show an ongoing, long-term process ignored by 
the insured, leading to the large amount of oil going 
into the ground over a significant period of time. The 
pollution exclusion should not be emasculated so as to 
compensate the insured in contravention of the policy's 
clear language, especially in light of the insured's 
failure to reasonably and properly respond over such a 
longer period of time. Hence, as a matter of law, 
coverage of the loss at the Gridley station is excluded 
under the Policy. 
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B. The Interpretation of the Pollution Exclusion 
is the Only Issue in this Appeal, 
Gridley Associates have indicated that they intend 
to argue on appeal that Transamerica is estopped from 
raising the pollution exclusion. The estoppel argument 
has no merit on appeal and is not properly before the 
Court of Appeals. The sole issue to be decided is the 
interpretation of the pollution exclusion. 
1. The Trial Court Ruled Upon the Sole Issue 
of the Applicability of the Pollution 
Exclusion. 
Transamerica moved the trial court for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the sole ground that "each policy 
under which plaintiffs might seek coverage for the 
gasoline leak . . . contained a pollution exclusion 
limiting coverage arising from such leaks to those caused 
by a * sudden and accidental' discharge.11 (Affidavit of 
Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the Addendum filed concurrently 
with this brief, page 3, paragraph 7; Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, Exhibit B in the Addendum filed 
concurrently with this brief, Motion pages 1-2.) 
Appropriately, the trial court based its ruling on that 
very issue: 
The Court's decision turns on 
its interpretation of the contract 
document and the definition of the 
term "sudden" as used in the 
pollution exclusion of the insurance 
policy. . . . [U]nder the 
uncontroverted facts concerning the 
gasoline leak the Court finds that 
it was accidental and sudden within 
the meaning of the policy and does 
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not come under the pollution 
exclusion as defendant contends. 
(Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the Addendum filed 
concurrently with this brief, page 4, paragraph 9; Minute 
Order, Exhibit C in the Addendum filed concurrently with 
this brief.) 
As a result of this ruling and the structure of the 
parties' Settlement Agreement and Release (Exhibit D in 
the Addendum filed concurrently with this brief), 
Transamerica stipulated to a Partial Summary Judgment: 
That the gasoline leak . . • is 
covered under . . . the subject 
insurance policy issued by 
Transamerica. . • . 
(Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the Addendum filed 
concurrently with this brief, pages 5-6, paragraph 12; 
Record at 595-97, Partial Summary Judgment.) 
Accordingly, the court entered judgment for Gridley 
Associates on their causes of action for breach of the 
insurance contract and declaratory relief, the First and 
Sixth Claims for Relief, respectively. 
While Gridley Associates argued that Transamerica is 
estopped from denying coverage (Record at 366-451, 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment), the trial court declined to 
reach that issue, presumably for the simple reason that 
it had no need to do so. Only if the court had agreed 
with Transamerica that the policies did not cover the 
gasoline leak would it have needed to determine if a 
question existed as to whether Transamerica was estopped 
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from asserting this non-coverage. Instead the court 
ruled that the policies did cover the leak; it therefore 
did not need to rule on the other issues raised by 
Gridley Associates. As such, the court never reached nor 
ruled upon the issue of estoppel. 
2. Estoppel Is Not an Issue in this Appeal. 
As agreed in the Settlement Agreement and Release, 
Transamerica appeals the Partial Summary Judgment that 
the policy covers the gasoline leak on the sole ground 
that the pollution exclusion within the policy bars such 
coverage. (Affidavit of Eric Olson, Exhibit A in the 
Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, page 5, 
paragraph 11; Settlement Agreement, Exhibit D in the 
Addendum filed concurrently with this brief, pages 7-8, 
paragraph 3.) Transamerica anticipates that Gridley 
Associates will argue, however, that Transamerica is 
estopped from denying coverage on this ground, calling 
such argument an alternate basis to affirm the trial 
court's ruling. This is an inaccurate characterization 
of the posture of this case. This appeal concerns 
whether, under the terms of the policy, the pollution 
exclusion applies to preclude coverage. This was the 
issue decided by the trial court. Questions of estoppel 
have absolutely no bearing on this matter of contract 
interpretation. Estoppel is a separate, quasi-
contractual issue, relevant on remand only if this Court 
determines that the pollution exclusion does apply. 
Moreoever, an argument that an insurer is estopped from 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1988, 1:05 P.M. 
-oOo-
BILLY GENE HANKINS 
called as a witness en behalf of the plaintiffs, 
being first duly sworn by the notary, testified 
as follows: 
EXAMINATION BY MR. MITCHELL 
0 Will you please state your full name and home 
address. 
A Billy Gene Hankins. 2 549 Esplanade, Chico. California 
95926. 
0 Are you employed, sir? 
A Yes. 
Q Where are you employed? 
A I have a part-time employment with Duratest Lighting 
Corporation. 
Q I also understand you're under some kind of a disability^ 
A Yes. I'm partially disabled from a previous occupation 
Q You used to work for Dockinaorf Equipment; is that 
correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q What's the full name of that company? 
A Dockindorf Equipment Company. 
Q During what period of time did you work for Dockindorf? 
A It was August of 1981 to June of '86. 
10 
11 
i Q What business was Dockindorf in? 
2 A He's a service station equipment and maintenance. 
3 Q What were your duties with Dock indorf during the time 
4 you were employed there? 
5 A Maintenance of equipments that have to do with the 
6 operation of gasoline service stations and overhead lube 
7 equipment. General maintenance of air compressors and other 
8 equipment that would be in a service station. 
9 Q What type of work did you do prior to joining Dockindorf 
in 1981? 
A I worked for part of the year under the name Norcai 
12 I Equipment Company as self-employed doing service station 
13 maintenance, removing of service stations, and fuel tanks, 
14 J dispensers, general installation as well as demolition. 
Previous to that, from 1977 to a time in 1981, I worked with 
16 I Petroleum Equipment Company, who was at that time based in 
17 Chico. And I was doing the same basic work of installing 
18 fueling systems, maintaining service stations and their 
19 J equipment. 
Q All right. 
A And previous to that I had my own business of heating 
and air conditioning under a state license of California, 
which included a substantial amount of controls electrical. 







25 conditioning business? Plumbing type work? 
i A Well, I have worked with plumbing type work since 
2 approximately 1953, '54/in general construction of homes 
3 and buildings, including all types of piping work in the 
4 homes, as well as natural gas lines, and then the petroleum 
5 lines when I went to work for Petroleum Equipment Company. 
6 Q Now, I asked you to come up from your home in California 
7 to appear at this deposition here today; is that correct? 
8 A Yes. 
9 I 0 And I paid your airline ticket? 
A Yes. 
Q And so we wouldn't ail have to go down to California 
12 I to Your residence? 
13 I A Yes. 
Q I'm also in addition paying you an hourly rate; is that 
15 I correct? 
is I A Yes. 
17 | 0 And that's $30 an hour? 











Q For your time? 
A Yes. 
Q You understand that my agreement to pay you your time 
has nothing to do with how you testify today? 
A No. I will not allow it to. 
0 We only want you to tell the truth. I'm going to ask 
you a series of questions about this Gridley station 
i occurrence. If you'll just indicate to me if you don't 
2 understand the question, 1*11 try to rephrase it. 
3 A Okay. 
4 Q You made the repairs to a gas line at the Gridley 
5 station in approximately February of 1986, on or about 
6 February 12, 1986; is that right? 
7 A Yes. I did work on a service station in Gridley. 
& I Q All right. And that was the Gridley Gas And Save? 
A Yes. 






A I was given a work order from Mr. Dockmdorf to test 
the lines in that station, because they indicated that they 
14 I thought they were losing fuel. So I was given a work order 
15 to test the petroleum lines in the station. 
16 \ Q So Y ° u then went out to the station? 
17 Were there any employees with you, or were you alone? 
18 I A Initially I had one other man with me. 
0 Who was that? 
A There were two different men on the job. I believe 
the first man that was on the job was my son Leon, who was 
22 | working temporarily for Dockindorf Equipment Company. 
23 . Q Can you tell me what you did after arriving at the 
24 station? 




i maintenance personnel, who at that time was Cal Boley, and 
2 to determine what they thought their problem was, and 
3 indicated he thought he had an underground leak. 
4
 Then we proceeded to test the lines for indication of 
5 leak. This would mean blocking off the fuel line both at 
6 the submersible pump and capping off the dispenser, 
7 pressurizing the line in between. And we were unable to 
8 maintain a pressure on the line. 
9 Q Which line was that? 
10 A It was a line leading to a dispenser on the outside 
n island, and I believe it was the north dispenser on the 
12 outside island. I don't remember which product it was. 
13 Q What did you then do? 
u A Well, our next procedure is to find if we have a leak. 
15 We have some indication that there was a leak in the area 
16 of the dispenser. So we dug out an area alongside of the 
17 island and we found no leak in that area, but indication 
18 that fuel was running in—alongside the lines from someplace 
19 other than the area we were at. 
20 And at that point we determined we would remove as much 
2i fuel from the lines as we could to get a free air capacity 




give us an ability to pressurize the lines. 
Since the fuel will not be forced up through the 
concrete or the pavement, but air will raise through those 
1 areas, we put a sufficient amount of air to allow it to leak 
2 out of wherever the leak would be, and then by watering down 
3 the area we will find the bubbles of where it comes up. And 
4 in this procedure we determined we had a leak some distance 
5 away from where we had initially started at the dispenser. 
6 Q How far away from the dispenser was it? 
7 A Approximately 40 foot in line of sight. It would have 
8 been closer to 50 foot as the lines were run. 
9 Q What did you then do? 
io A Well, it's a process then of digging down in that area 
ii to expose whatever lines there are in that area, as we had 
12 exposed an amount of line at that time, but then we had to 
13 dig down and expose the line to find where the leak was. 
14 Q Did you find where the leak was? 
15 A Yes, we did. 
16 I 0 How far underground was it? 
A Let's see. Approximately 18 inches. 
18 I 0 Did you determine what caused the leak? 
i9 J MR. OLSON: Objection. No foundation. 
A I wasn't sent out to determine what caused the leak. 
I was sent out to repair a leak if it existed. 
22 | Q (By Mr. Mitchell) What I'm asking you is, did you 
23 | determine the source of the leak? 
24 I A We determined the source of the leak, y e s . 




i A We had a broken f i t t i n g — o r , a broken pipe alongside 
2 of a fitting. 
3 Q Can you describe the break for me? 
4
 A The break was in the pipe right next to the fitting, 
5 which is the weakest part of any pipeline. 
6 Q Was it a clean break? 
7 A Yes. There was a clean break. 
8 Q In your opinion was that break caused b y — i n your 
9 opinion, what was that break caused by? 
io MR. OLSON: Objection. No foundation. 
ii A I--
12 Q (By Mr. Mitchell) Let me rephrase that. In your 
13 opinion was that break caused by something sudden? 
14 MR. OLSON: Objection. No foundation. 
15 Q (By Mr. Mitchell) Go ahead. 
16 A A break of this sort would have had to have been caused 
17 by an adjustment of the area in which it is in. Something 
18 I would have had to have moved that area. 
19 0 Movement of the earth? 
20 MR. OLSON: Objection. Object to the leading 
2i nature of the question. 
22 Q (By Mr. Mitchell) You're talking about movement of 
23 the earth when you say "adjustment of the earth"? 
24 MR. OLSON: Objection. Leading. 








i entitled to make objections for the record, and they will 
2 be ruled on at an appropriate time; but that has nothing 
3 to do with you. So when I ask a question, he's put his 
4 objection on the record, and then you can go ahead and 
5 answer it, 
6 A Okay. I understand. In that case—when we would have 
7 a break of this sort, it would most logically be caused by 
8 a movement of the ground such as would be caused by usually 
9 J heavy equipment. If heavy equipment has rolled across an 
area, we could~we would have the possibility of a movement 
enough of the ground to have caused this sort of a break. 
Q Was there any evidence that the pipe had been tampered 
with? Any intentional damage to the pipe? 
14 I A No work had been done in that area before we came. Any 
15 J disturbance of the ground was done at the time that we came 
there. No previous work had been done in any short period 
17 I of time. 
t8 I Q This leak was actually in the gas line; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Would the gas leak constantly or only when the pump 
21 i was activated? 
22 | MR. OLSON: Objection. No foundation. 
23 , A A leak of this sort would occur only if there was 
24 I pressure on the line. 
25 I Q (By Mr. Mitchell) How would that pressure be caused? 
A Because a dispenser was turned off. 
Q In other words, you lift the lever of the dispenser, 
and gas would flow through, and then it would leak through 
the break? 
A Yes, because this is a submersible pump system. 
Q Then conversely, when you turned the pump off, what 
would happen? 
A Well, the pressure relieves from the system down to 
the point of whatever pressure is usually static on the line. 
Q So when the pump was off, the leak would stop? 
A It would stop if there—if there were a leak present, 
it would stop only when there were no pressures on the line. 
Q I'm talking about this particular leak. 
A Yes. They would go down to zero pressure on the line. 
Q What did you do to repair the leak? 
A Remove the broken fittings, replace the line from that 
point to the dispenser, and at that point put in new fittings 
and pipeline to the point that we could re-establish the 
system and safely function without a leak. 
Q Are you aware of the fact that there was an earthquake 
in the Gridley area sometime prior to this gas leak? 
MR. OLSON: Objection. No foundation. 
A Yes, there was an earthquake in that area. 
Q (By Mr. Mitchell) Did you experience that earthquake? 
A I didn't personally experience it, but it was highly 
11. 
1 publicized by the news producers. 
2 MR. OLSON: Motion to strike the answers to the 
3 last two questions on the grounds that there was no 
4 foundation. This witness is without personal knowledge. 
5 Q (By Mr. Mitchell) Where did you read about the 
6 earthquake? 
7 MR. OLSON: Objection. Hearsay. 
8 A It was in the newspapers. It was on the news, for some 
9 J period of time. 
Q (By Mr. Mitchell) Where did you reside at the time? 
A In Chico, where I reside now. 

















MR* OLSON: Objection. Hearsay. 
A Yes. They gave accounts that there was damage. 
Q (By Mr. Mitchell) Would the break in the pipe which 
you saw at Gridley station be consistent with a break caused 
by an earthquake? 
MR. OLSON: Objection. No foundation. 
A It could have caused it. 
Q (By Mr. Mitchell) At least, it would not be 
inconsistent with having been caused by an earthquake; is 
that true? 
MR. OLSON: Same objection. 
A It would be feasible that it could have been done. 
i Q (By Mr. Mitchell) Was there any evidence that the leak 
2 had been caused simply by the pipe deteriorating and 
3 eventually rotting through? 
4 A There was deterioration, but it was not a complete 
5 deterioration through the line. 
6 0 And the break that you've described was a clean break? 
7 A Yes. 
e Q Did you keep any of the parts that were on the old line? 
9 I A As a rule we remove all materials from the station area 
and return them to the yard. It's a safety factor. What 
happens to them thereafter we're not concerned with. If 
it laid around the yard very long, Mr. Dockendorf would have 
salvaged it with whatever used pipe we had, which was a 
common practice. 
Q Did anyone request that you keep the parts for any 
purpose? 
A No. 
MR. MITCHELL: I don't have anything else. 
EXAMINATION BY MR. OLSON 
Q Mr. Hankins, my name is Eric Olson. I represent 
Transamerica Insurance Company, and we're the defendant in 
this case. I would like to ask you a few questions, 
following up on some things that Mr. Mitchell has asked you. 
First of all, when were you first made aware of the 

















i A I don't recall, but it's been at least a year. 
2 0 Who told you about it? 
3 A I received a call from Cal Boley's superior, and I 
4 don't—I'm trying to think of the man's name. 
5 MR. MITCHELL: Vern Dickman? 
6 THE WITNESS: Yes. Vern Dickman. 
7 I Q (By Mr. Olson) This was about a year ago? 
A It's been at least a year ago. 
9 | Q What did Mr. Dickman say to you in that telephone 
call? 
A He wanted to know if I remembered the job and if I 
remembered any specifics about the job. 
Q At that time did you remember the job? 







15 difficult job. And so I remembered what we went through 
16 
17 
to—to correct the problem. 









A Part of the fact that the lines that we were working 
on were buried underneath other lines. You have not that 
much area to work with, and it becomes difficult to repair 
an area without tearing up too large an area and yet keep 
the station in business. And the primary concern of the 
customer is to keep their station in business. And so it 
becomes a problem to repair the extent of the damage and 
put the station back—or, keep the station active while you 
are working, because you always have the Hazard of traffic 
in and out. Those things are present in your mind when you 
nearly get run over a time or two at a station. 
Q Other than the fact that these lines were below other 
lines that were necessary to operate the station, was there 
any other aspect of the job that made it unusual or 
particularly difficult? 
A Part of it is the fact that the lines were in that 
station. Some of the original lines were buried in native 
soil, which is a clay material, and it's—it doesn't dig 
out easily. It sticks to your shovel, sticks to your feet 
and your shoes. It's difficult to work with. 
Q Did that present some problems in this particular 
instance in digging out to the lines? 
A It presented time. 
Q Now, you talk about the original lines. Were there 
some lines you understood to have been placed at some point 
in time earlier than other lines? 
A Yes, because there had been rebuilding work done in 
the stations, other dispensers had been added. There were 
newer lines in the station. 
Q Were the lines at which this break had occurred, were 
those among what you considered the original lines, or the 









i A I don't have any means by which to know at what time 
2 the line was put in, other than there was probably 25 percent 
3 corrosion on the lines, sufficient that we could not thread 
4 the lines. We needed to replace them. 
s 0 When you say the lines, you're talking about the lines 
6 you had to replace? 
7 A Pipelines, yes. 
8 Q Now, was the line you were working on where this break 
g occurred, were these among the oldest lines that you observed 
10 on the property? 
n A No. There were older lines on the property. 
12 Q But these lines, iji any event, were buried underneath 
13 some newer lines; is ,that correct? 
14 A Yes. 
is Q Now, in your conversation with Mr. Dickman, did he ask 
16 you any other questions other than, ftDid you remember the 
17 particular job?" 
18 A He wanted to know if I had remembered the work and 
process that we went through to get to it. I don't remember 
him giving me any reason for his call, until later on in 
our conversation. He—he just wanted to know about the work, 
and I was—I was trying to remember it, because, depending 
on the work that has previously been done, at times if we 
needed information we would go back and find people who had 
done work on stations before and ask them what they had done. 
1 It greatly simplifies the work you're doing in the future. 
2 Q And you remembered this particular job; is that correct? 
3 A Yes. 
* 0 Did you describe to Mr. Dickman essentially what you've 
5 told us today in answer to Mr. Mitchell's questions? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q Had you ever spoken to Mr. Dickman before? 
8 A I knew of him because of his position in the maintenance 
9 of the stations and because I had been sent to different 
10 stations. I was not personally acquainted with him. 
i Q I take it that about the time or around the time that 
2 the work was done on this Gridley station you had dene other 
3 work on other stations of Mr. Dickman's; is that correct? 
4 A Not that I was aware*of, because I was not really 
5 acquainted with Mr. Dickman. He was in a higher position 
6 than we usually deal with. The people we usually deal with 
7 are in the position of Cal Boley or their—their the local 
8 maintenance individual. We seldom have contact with those 
g of higher level. 
Q So was this occasion about a year ago when you spoke 
with Mr. Dickman the first time that you had actually 
spoken with Mr. Dickman? 
A To my knowledge it is. 
Q Was it also the first time after the occasion on which 
you made the repairs to the pipe that you spoke with anyone 
1 about that repair? 
2 A It was only just briefly before that. Cal called me 
3 and asked me to call Mr. Dickman. Left a number for me to 
4 call him. That would be the only fact in it. He just said 
5 it to Mr. Dickman he wanted to talk to me at the station. 
6 Q You called Mr. Dickman rather than— 
7 A I called him back, because he had tried calling me, 
8 and we had not made contact. 
9 J Q And Cal Boley had called you just before that occasion 
to asK you to call Mr. Dickman; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q And prior to Mr. Boley calling you to ask you to call 
13 J Mr. Dickman, had you spoken with anyone else about this break 
14 in the pipe there at that Gridley station? 
15 A I don't recall any knowledge of it, any concern on it. 
16 Q All right. 
17 A By the time I was no longer working for Mr. Dockindorf. 
18 I Q There was mention at the outset of your deposition of 
a disability. What's the nature of that disability? 
A I have a sprained disk in the fourth and fifth lumbar 









22 Q When did you suffer that injury? '? 
A I believe it was April 21 of '86. 
Q Did that result in your eventually leaving 
25 Mr. Dockindorf's employ? 
1 A Yes. In a month I was off of work, and I have not 
2 returned to work for him since. 
3 Q Are you presently employed in any way? 
* A Well, I—I--I do have a—I sell for Duratest Lighting 
5 Corporation, which is not a full-time, but they would like 
6 to have it be a full-time, but it's what time I can work. 
7 Q And that's a sales position? 
e A Sales. 
9 I Q I take it from the background that you described in 
10 i response to Mr. Mitchell's questioning that you spent 
n J approximately nine years give or take a few months in the 
12 I business of servicing service station type equipment; is 
13 that correct? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q In the course of that employment did you have occasion 
16 I to make the type of repair that we're talking about here 
17 I in this particular litigation on a fairly regular basis? 





Q Was there other than what you've already described about 
the particular location of the pipes in relation to other 
pipes and the type of soil, was there anything else about 
22 this particular repair that is notable in your mind or 
distinct from your normal experience with these types of 
24 repairs? 
25 A Normally when we have a leaK, it would be a corrosion 
i that had ate through the pipe; but on this occasion we had 
2 not only corrosion, but we had a clean break, and this is 
3 not a normal circumstance. 
4 The ground in the Gridley area across the river into 
5 the west side into Willows and those areas is what we in 
6 the layman's term call hot earth, because it is more 
7 susceptible to grounding, and it causes more rusting in the 
B pipes, which is actually an electrolysis than usual. 
9 J We have replaced multiples of lines that have literally 
rotted through, but these are usually always because the 
rust has become so great that there is no longer any tensile 
strength for the pipe to hold the fuel. In this case we 
had a clean break, along with the corrosion. 
Q Now, you indicated that you were joined on at least 
one—strike that. Let's go back. How many occasions did 
you actually go to the property either to evaluate where 
the leak was at or to make the repairs? 
A I don't remember the length of time, but we went to 
the property, determined we had a more extensive problem 
than we could repair in that day. And from that point it 
takes authorization to do a greater amount of work. 
We went back. I'm not certain if it was the next day. 
I believe it was another day or two later. We went back, 
prepared to tear up the area and do whatever work that was 




























1 Q How many days total were occupied, then, in doing this 
2 repair? I'm not talking about— 
3 A I really don't remember, but by the time we dug it out, 
4 repaired the lines, and finished back both the concrete and 
5 the blacktop, it could have been ask much as three days. 
6 Q So this would be three days total; is that correct? 
7 A Yes, it's a little far back for me to remember, and 
a I didn't have any other information that recorded thar. 
9 I Q Well, was your time billed out on an hourly basis to 
the customer? 
A I don't—I don't know how Mr. Dockindorf billed that 
out, but in a case like this it would usually be time and 
13 I material. 
14 J Q Time and material? 
A Yes. 
16 I Q Did you have any involvement then in the billing of 
17 this? 
18 I A No. All I did was write out a material and labor record 
describe what I did, describe the materials that I used, 
and write down the time of myself and men that were on the 
job. Off of that material and labor record Mr. Dockindorf 
would make his bill to the company. 
Q And Mr. Dockendorf would have all those documents at 
this time, is that correct, if anybody has them? 





1 documents once he had made a bill. That's just his way of 
2 doing business. Whatever is on the written bill that was 
3 given to the company would be most possibly the only record 
4 that would be available presently. 
5 Q You mean whatever Mr. Dickman's company received would 
6 be the only available record in your experience? 
7 A Mr. Dockindorf had a habit of throwing away the labor 
8 and material records. 
9 I Q It's your belief that in this instance that's probably 
what he did? 
A Yes. It would be the greatest possibility. 
Q In the course of your visits to the property to make 
the repair, were you the only person that made that visit? 
u I I think you indicated that at least on one occasion you were 
15 accompanied by your son? 
A I believe my son Leon was with me on the job, and also 
a Sam Sumner I believe was on that job, too. He's another 
one of the maintenance men from Mr. Dockindorf. 
Q Do you know if Mr. Sumner still works for Mr. Dockindorf^ 
A He does. 
0 Where does he reside? Does he live in Chico there? 
A No. He lives in the McGalia area. Paradise Pines. 
Q Is your son still with Dockindorf? 
A No. No. He's working with Griffin Equipment. Barry 











i Q In any event, he still lives in the area, is that 
2 correct? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q Where does he live? 
5 A He lives I think it's 1647, I believe it is, East 
6 Avenue. 
7 Q East Avenue? 
g (Witness nods head.) 
9 IQ In Chico? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, did both your son Leon and Mr. Sumner observe this 
break that you have described for us? 
A Leon may have. I don't believe that Sam did. 
Q Why is it you draw that distinction in your mind? 
A Sam came on the job a little later to help us finish 
up on the main construction after we found the—anything 
that Sam would have seen would have probably been out of 
the ground and a removed piece of pipe. If he had any 
recollection, that would have been what he saw. 
Q Have you discussed this particular repair with your 
son at all to see what his recollection is? 
A No. He had his head in the air at that time. All he 
wanted was payday and Friday was all he was interested in. 
Q Letfs go back to something before I forget. After 

















i heard from anybody about this case? 
2 A We had another conversation. He called me again, wanted 
3 to know if I had been contacted by anybody in reference to 
4 it. 
5 Q Was this recently, or was this— 
6 A It was after—no. It was—no, that would have been, 
7 oh, six or eight months ago. The time element—his first 
8 contact with me may have been longer than that. I really 
9 J don't remember. 
Q Do you recall in that first contact he mentioned 
ultimately there was litigation about this question? 











13 what the losses were and who was going to pay for them. 
Q Did he say there was actually a lawsuit filed, or did 
he just say— 
A I don't remember whether he did or not. 
0 Do you recall anything else that Mr. Dickman said to 
18 | you in that first conversation other than what you've already 
indicated to us? 
A No. I—I don't. I think I'm probably getting mixed 
21 I up in my mind conversations with him and conversations with 
22 I Mr. Mitchell. 
Q You did at some point in time speak with Mr. Mitchell 
as well; is that correct? 
25 (Witness nods head.) 
1 0 Did you speak with anyone else other than Mr. Mitchell 
2 from Mr. Mitchell's office? 
3 A No. Not that I remember. He is the only one I've 
4 talked to. 
5 Q Hew many times have you spoken with Mr. Mitchell about 
6 this? 
7 A I believe it was twice. 
8 Q What was the first time that you spoke to Mr. Mitchell? 
9 J A Well, I don't remember the time element on that, sir; 
but it was at the very least early spring of this year. 
Q It was after the last time you had spoken with 
Mr. Dickman; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
14 I Q Do you recall what you and Mr. Mitchell talked about 
15 during the course of that conversation? 
16 A Basically the conversation we have had here is 
17 questions he asked me, wanted to know about it. 
is I Q Did he give you any information in the course of that 
conversation other than just ask you questions? 
A No, I don't recall any information on that, other than 
that there was litigation involved. He did tell me that 
22 | there was litigation involved. 
23 I Q Then Mr. Mitchell spoke with you a second time after 
24 that? 








i Q At that time did you get into a conversation about the 
2 facts of the break, or was it just simply setting up the 
3 time for the deposition that we're here at today? 
4 A No, we usually referred back to the previous 
5 conversation that there was a necessity for a deposition. 
6 Q Did Mr. Mitchell have an opportunity to meet with you 
7 J today prior to this deposition, as well? 
8 i A Yes. 




he had about the break at the Gridley station? 
A We basically discussed the same thing we discussed here-
12 I He wanted to know why I felt that way, what my background 
13 was, my work background, the period of time I had worked, 
t4 I the length of my background, what I was doing presently. 
Q So you basically went over essentially what's been 
16 I covered already in this deposition; is that correct? 
17 A Everything we covered has pretty well been brought out 
18 I here. 
Q Did Mr. Mitchell at any time show you any documents 
or send you any documents? 
A I don't believe so, other than a plane ticket. 
22 | Q I s e e* 
A He just sent me that. A letter saying that he wanted 
24 i me to come. I don't remember anything else. 







2 I A I don't believe he has. 
3 Q Now, going back to the actual circumstances that 
4 occurred back—I believe the testimony was February of 1986 
6 —do you recall specifically in your mind that it was 
6 February of 1986 that this occurred? 
; J A I don't—I don't recall the definite date of the work 
at all. 
9 | Q Do you even recall the year that it occurred? 
A I wouldn't commit myself to that, sir. At the period 
of time, I was not keeping a log book, which I have at times, 
but I was not keeping a log book at that time. So it would 
be difficult for me to put a date on that as to when we 
worked. Any information as far as the time of the work would 
have had to have come out of Mr. Dockindorffs records. I 
really don't have a definite date on it. 
Q Are there any records that you're aware of today that 
Mr. Dockindorf would have that would reflect the time of 
the work? 
A Just the date on his bill. 
Q Does he maintain that bill as a part of his records 
in your experience? 
A Oh, yes. He keeps records on those. 
0 So to the extent that in the course of your testimony 

















i you were simply adopting whatever counsel's suggestion was 
2 as to the date of that repair; is that correct? 
3 A Yes. I never researched anything on that. If any 
4 comment was made as far as the date was concerned, it had 
5 to come out of somebody else's records than mine, because 
6 I didn't—in fact, when—and I don't remember the date that 
7 he asked, but I did go back over my log books to see if I 
e had recorded anything. And from that six months period of 
9 time, at that time I had not kept a log book. 
10 Q You say six months period of time. And that pericd 
n I of time we were referring to? 
12 A Basically in that range of time. I didn't have any 
13 records in my books. y There were times when I faithfully 
14 kept a log book. There were times when I flaked out. 
15 Q Did you know Cal Boley before you did this particular 
16 repair? 
17 A No. I had heard the name, but I didn't know him. 
18 0 Now, when I speak of this repair, so we understand each 
19 other, I'm referring to the repair of the Gridley station 
that we've been talking about here. 
(Witness nods head.) 
Q I don't want to say that whole sentence every time. 
All right? Had you done work at Mr. Boley's request on any 
prior occasion before you did this particular repair? 







1 had been on a job, which he was not on any job. I don't 
2 know what stations he has control over. Mr. Dockindorf would 
3 have given me a work order to do work on a certain station. 
4 Whether it belonged to that company or not I would not have 
5 knowledge of. 
6 Q So to the best of your knowledge as you sit here today, 
7 you don't know whether prior to this repair you've done any 
8 repairs for any other stations owned by Mr. Dickman or run 
9 by Mr. Boley; is that correct? 
io A I wouldn't have any knowledge as to who had control 
of the stations. 
Q Is Mr. Boley still operating that station? 
A Mr. Boley is still in the area. The only reason I know 
u I that is because I bought some musical equipment from him, 
15 and other than that I don't know whether he's tied up with 
16 the station or not. He had been a professional musician. 
17 I just bought some of his equipment. 
18 Q Now, who actually gave you the assignment to go out 










A Craig Dockindorf. 
Q Is he the Dock ndorf from Dockindorf Equipment? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, what did he tell you you were supposed to go do? 
What was his comment to you about what you were supposed 
to go do? 
2 I A Craig just says: "Just go find out what the problem 
3 is. Let me know what it is." He has a radio in his truck. 
4 If you've got a problem, you call him. He tells you what 
5 to do. 
6 Q Was Dockindorf Equipment limited to simply doing repairs 
7 or did they also do installations, sell gas, service station 
8 equipment, as well? 
9 J A He sells all forms of equipment that had to do with 
the petroleum industry. All forms, whether it's a fuel truckt 
aviation, whatever. He has equipment and repair parts for 
12 , all of them. A substantial amount of his work was new 
13 I dispensers, or used dispensers and pumps, and the control 
14 j systems that went with them. He got as little underground 
work as he could get away with. 













18 A Installation. 
Q —as well as doing the type of maintenance work that 
we're talking about here today; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
0 So after he had directed you to go to the Gridley 
station, you went to the station? 
(Witness nods head.) 


























did. But if you could specifically tell me the first thing 
you did in order to pinpoint wherever this particular leak 
was. 
A Well, the first step was to have a conversation with 
Mr. Boley as to what he felt his problem was, because he 
is the local maintenance man of that area. From that point, 
then we would proceed to close down the system that we were 
working on, which entailed nonoperation signs on the 
dispenser and things of that sort, which would keep anyone 
from turning on the system. Shut down that system, so that 
we would have a clean opportunity to pressure-test the lines. 
0 How many service islands were there at this particular 
location? 
A There are two islands. 
Q Two islands. How many pumps on each one? 
A I believe there's two pumps on each. I'm not certain 
of that. Two dispensers, I should say. Not pumps. They're 
dispensers. 
Q So a total of four dispensers in the entire system? 
A I don't remember there being any more than that. 
Q 'Now, aside from the dispensers, is there like a building 
of some sort where they operate or they receive the money 
and so forth? 
A There is a mobile home, which is established and could 


























has an office in it where you pay for the gas. 
Q At the time you visited the location, did they do 
anything at the location other than—to your observation 
was there any business conducted there other than just 
selling gasoline? 
A Not other than the usual coke machine or things of that 
sort would be in the area. 
Q There wasn't a little market cr anything like that? 
A No. 
Q There was no garage or— 
A Cigarettes or coke, or something of that sort they had, 
but no—not beyond that. 
~Q There was no maintenance bay there, I take it? 
A No, no. 
Q How large are the premises to the best of your 
observation? 
A Oh, close to 150, 175 foot of road frontage and 90 to 
100 feet deep is about the area. 
0 Is the entire property being used in one form or another 
for the service station operation? 
A The station backs up into an orchard area, and how much 
of that area belongs to the service station area I have no 
idea. 
0 But the 170 feet by 90 feet you've described is being 


























one form or another? 
A It divides off into somewhat of an angle from the south 
side toward the north side, where the north side has a little 
less use of the area than the south side. 
Q So the road just runs in a north-south direction; is 
that correct? 
A Yes- It is Highway 99E. 
Q Are the two fuel islands also oriented in a north-south 
direction? 
A Yes. 
Q Does this mobile home office you've described, is that 
on the rear side of the property? 
A Yes. 
Q It sort of runs parallel with the fuel islands as well; 
is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, of the two fuel islands, which one is the island 
that has the dispenser that was experiencing the pressure 
difficulties? 
A Well, both islands had the dispenser on it, but our 
initial work began on the outside island, because that's 
where the evidence was. But the line divided and went to 
both islands, because it is a submersible pump system. 
Q Was this line carrying leaded or unleaded fuel, do you 
know? 
i A I donf t remember, 
2 Q Now, you've basically described a rectangular piece 
3 of property. Is that correct? 
4 A Yes. Pretty close to it. I think it's a little bit 
5 further north and south than it is east and west. 
6 Q Now, is it correct, my understanding, that the fuel 
7 J islands are essentially in the middle of the property? 
e |A Essentially, yes. 




to the tank where the fuel was stored that was leaking? 
A The tanks lay on the south side of the lot, centered 
nearly on the inside, on the south side of the inside island, 





Q Was there more than one tank? 
A Yes, there is. But I don't remember how many. Two 
or three. I don't remember. 
Q So when you arrived at the property and you spoke to 
10 (Mr. Boley, what specifically did he tell you about the 







A He was experiencing a loss of fuel. Their totalizers 
on the dispensers and their fuel going into the tank was 
not corresponding. 
Q Discrepancy there? 
A There was a discrepancy between the product being sold 


























Q Did he tell you precisely what sort cf discrepancy they 
were experiencing? 
A If he did, I don't recall. 
Q Do you recall in general his indicating that was a large 
discrepancy or a small discrepancy? 
A It was a sizable discrepancy, yes. 
Q Did he indicate for what period of time they had been 
experiencing that discrepancy? 
A He made a comment that he thought it had—it had been 
some--there had been some time. I don't remember any time 
element being given as to that. 
Q Just the general comment that it had been some time? 
A A comment that they were—it had—there had been enough 
discrepancy that they had taken definite consideration that 
there was a time element in which they would check to see 
if they lost any, which is standard procedure in service 
stations. A leak you will check a certain period of time 
with the totalizers against the fuel to make certain that 
your bookwork is proper, and then the bookwork is the first 
thing we look at. 
Q I see. You as the maintenance person? 
A Yes. The first thing we request is: "How does your 
totalizers match with your product? Is all of your product 
being sold? Are you selling less product than what you're 
















1 you're bringing in?11 
2 Q Did he actually show you the bookwork, or simply 
3 characterize it for you? 
4 A No. We just admonished him to go back and check his 
5 bookwork. 
6 Q Did he indicate he had such bookwork to check? 
7 A Oh, yes. 
8 Q But you never actually consulted that yourself or 
9 J discussed it with him other than to tell him to check it? 
A No. 
Q After you had checked it—or, after you had discussed 
that with him—and you had them, I guess, shut down the fuel 
system; is that correct? 
14 | (Witness nods head.) 
MR. MITCHELL: You have to answer. 
0 (By Mr. Olson) You have to say yes or no. 
A Yes. We shut down the system. 
Q Describe to me again what it was you did once the system 
was shut down in order to make the first step towards 
identifying the nature, if any, of the problem. 
A Well, this type of system, our first thing would be 
to shut off the safety valves on the dispenser and close 
off the check valve at the pump and pressurize the tank—or, 
the lines from the dispenser to the tank. And in doing so 


























Q You have drawn a distinction between the dispenser and 
the pump. I take it the dispenser is the thing that I pull 
the nozzle out of and stick in my car. Is that correct? 
A The distinction between a dispenser and a pump is that 
a dispenser has no pumping unit within it. A pump would 
draw fuel from a tank. A dispensei would receive it 
pressurized from the bank. 
Q So in this type of system where is the pump located? 
A Submerged m the tank. 
Q In the tank. So it's some 40 or 50 leet away from the 
dispenser? 
A Close to 75 feet, at least, on this system. 
Q When you took t£e readings of this uneven pressure, 
that's an indication there is some sort of a fault in the 
system; is that correct? 
A If the line will not hold the pressure, then you have 
to find out why. 
Q Where do you first look then in order to try to make 
a determination of the reason why thai, would not hold 
pressure? 
A Well, this type of system, there is an access plug on 
the safety valve under the dispenser, and that is on the 
pipe side of the valve, closing the valve. And closing the 
valve at the submersible pump, you have the possibility of 
gaining pressure, positive pressure on the line that should 
i be able to maintain easily 50 pounds. 
2 0 So you basically close off at the plug and close off 
3 at the pump, and then you induce some pressure into the line? 
4 A Induce air into the line. Pressurize it. You have 
5 a close off valve with the pressure at the gauge, and the 
6 pressure gauge should maintain the pressure that you put 
7 into it. 
e 0 In this case that's what you did? You closed off those 
9 J two valves? 
A Yes. 
Q Put the pressure in, and I take it the line would not 
maintain the pressure? 
A The line would not maintain pressure, no. 















15 was not maintaining pressure? 
A At that point we looked for fuel losses, and the 
indication was that there was fuel under the dispenser. So 
is | we dug out on the side of the dispenser in the isiand drive 
slab area to find the lines and be able to dig into those 
lines to determine if we had a leak at that point. 
Q And what you found is there was no leak at that point? 
A We found no leaks at that point. And when you find 
no leak at that point, you progress further back the line. 
As we progressed further back of the line, we began to find 



























Q What was the evidence? Was it just the fuel itself, 
or was it a higher concentration— 
A Fuel flowing out of the pipeline area into the ditch 
we were working in. 
Q Was it large amounts of fuel? 
A Yes. 
Q So are we talking about as you trenched, you would 
actually have gasoline pooling in some form in your trencn; 
is that right? 
A Yes. 
0 How deep was the trench that you were digging? 
A Probably 12 inches at the island area. 
Q That's about how deep the pipe was buried; is that 
correct? 
A Yes, usually at that area where you cover it. If we 
can't cover it with concreter we like it to be deeper. 
Q Now, in this particular service station was the paving 
a concrete paving, or was it an oil paving, or what? 
A There was concrete on the drive areas between the 
dispensers and the islands. There is asphalt from that area 
over to the tanks, which are, once again, covered with 
concrete. 
Q You indicated that a 12-inch depth for the pipes in 
the area covered by concrete is an acceptable depth? 
i I A By code you can go down to six inches. 
2 I Q How about on those areas where it's covered by asphalt, 
3 is there a greater depth of burying the pipe? 
4 A Not on this size of pipe, but it is a general practice 
5 that we do go down with it. If we cannot get it lower, then 
5 we concrete over it before we put asphalt in it. 
7 Q Now, you say "this size of pipe." Will you give me 
8 the size of pipe you're talking about? 
9 J A Inch and a half galvanized. 
Q And it's a galvanized pipe from the point ot the 
dispenser all the way back to the pump; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
















pipe as to how long it had been in the ground? 
17 A That's difficult to do with the type of group and with 
the condition of other pipes around it; and not having any 
history of the station, it's difficult to make a 
determination. 
Q Is that important to know in making the repairs? 
A Only as it has to do with whatever corrosion may be 
on the pipelines. 
0 Did you ask Mr. Boley, for instance, how long the pipe 


























A If I did, I don't recall the conversation. 
Q You indicated earlier there were some pipes that ran 
over the top of the pipe that was being repaired; is that 
correct? 
A Yes, sir. There had been other work done in the 
station after this line was in there, and they were newer 
pipes. They were newer lines and above this line. 
Q Were these also galvanized one and a half inch pipe? 
A Yes. 
Q Was it observable as you look at the two sets of pipe, 
the difference in age between the two? 
A There was difference in age of the two as they were 
in the ditch. As we come to the place where the break was, 
I don't remember that the new piping was alongside of the 
old piping, although there were—the piping was very close 
to each other, which contributed to the difficulty of working 
with it. 
Q Just to look at the two sets of pipe, did the old pipe 
look older than the new pipe? 
A The pipe where the break was was definitely an older 
pipe. 
Q What was it about that looked older, as you observed 
the two? 
A As I said before, approximately, maybe 25, 30 percent 
















\ the pipe, the life of the pipe material. 
2 0 When you used the term corrosion, just for my 
3 visualizing in my mind, are we talking about a decomposition 
4 of the material in the pipe? 
b A You call it rust. 
6 Q Rust? 
7 I A Yes. 
Q Is that what it is? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, you indicated you did some form of testing to 
determine exactly the location of the break; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Apart from putting the pressure into the pipe, what 
14 | else did you do in order to find the precise location of 
the break? 
A Well, the first step you do is take as much fuel out 
of the line as you can get out. You want as much air in 
the line as you can. It's the volume of air that will give 
you the ability to find the leak. And as we interject a 
volume of air into the system, then that volume of air will— 
it will go out where the leak is. 
At that point, by using water and hosing down the area, 
the air will come up through the asphalt where the fuel 
would not tend to come up through the asphalt. It would 24 
25 tend to follow wherever the pipe ditches fill. It comes 
i up wherever it relieves with air. But the air will come 
2 up. And so you would find the bubbles. And wherever those 
3 bubbles are, that's where you would excavate. 
4
 Q So you were just wetting down the asphalt and pulling 
5 air through the pipe and watching where the bubbles came 
6 out of the asphalt? 
7 A Yes, because we have no idea m a system like this where 
8 the pipelines run. 
9 I Q Did that take you several hours to get to the point 
where when you first talked to Mr. Boley ana arrivea at the 
scene until the time you found out where it was? 


















Q And you thought it was there where you found the first 
gasoline near the dispenser; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, on that first day that you were there, did you 
actually excavate and locate the portion of pipe that these 
bubbles were coming out of? 
A I don't remember that we got that far the first day 
or not. 
Q At least— 
A It would have been feasible to have gotten that far, 


















^ \ Q At a minimum you do recall that you had seen the bubbles 
2 I at that point and had an idea of where it would be; is that 
3 correct? 
4 A Yes, 
5 Q All right. But at some point in time you did excavate 
6 J it down to the pipe itself; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
8 I Q Describe for me how you went about excavating it. Was 
9 J this with a machine, or did you do it by hand? 
A We dug it by hand. 
Q This is you and your son? 
A Yes. We take off the asphalt off the top, usually lay 
it aside, because that, we haul off. And it's a case of 
shoveling down to the area where you can get to the pipe. 
Q How thick was the asphalt that was over that particular 
area? 
A It was two and a half, thre£ inch. 
Q You testified that the pipe was about 18 inches deep; 
is that correct? 
A Approximately. 
Q That's 18 inches from the top of the asphalt to where 
the pipe was located? 
A Close. Yes. 
Q So you dug about a foot and a quarter of actual dirt 
material before you reached the pipe itself; is that correct? 
i A As I remember the job, yes. 
2 0 Now, was it in the course of this digging that the 
3 difficulty arose with the other pipes being around the pipe 
4 you were attempting to fix? 
5 A Well, you have to dig around all of the pipes, and you 
6 have to clean the pipes off to be able to find where the 
? leak is. And even then the leak may not be visible. It 
e may be on the bottom side of the line. Most of the times 
9 J it is. And then you would have to clean around the lines, 
clean off the lines enough to be able to find where your 
leak is at. 
Q I guess it would be necessary, would it not, to 
actually dig under the pipe, so that you can get some 
perspective on the pipe? 
A Usually we will dig down to the pipes and clear as much 
on the pipes as we can. And once we're down to that 
location, we go back to our testing procedure, so that we 
find closer to where we're at. And once you've found the 
area, you know where you have to work, what you have to work 
with and where you have to work. 
Q Do you recall doing that on this occasion? 
A Yes. 
Q After you dug down and exposed the pipes, then you went 
back to testing and blowing air through the system again? 

















i we would have pressure on the line when we're digging down 
2 close to that area, so that we don't dig in the wrong 
3 direction. You dig toward where the area is coming out, 
4 and then once you get down to the point that you've founa 
5 your problem, you prospect that very area to see what you 
6 have, because it's just common practice. You don't dig any 
7 more than you nave to. 
8 Q Sure. So you would actually keep water running so that 
9 J you would have the bubbles coming up as an indicator of where 
you're supposed to be headed? 
A No. Once you have found the basic area, you would 
remove the water, because it's difficult to work in. And 
















14 found was fuel. You're working in a level of fuel. 
Q So you were working through the fuel towards the hole? 
A Yes. 
Q In this instance was it necessary to dig under the pipe 
at ail in order to get out the particular break? 
A Oh, yes. We had to dig around them to be able to get 
to the break. 
Q Did there come a time when you could actually then see 
the point at which the pipe had broken? 
A Yes. 
Q Was that on the first day that you were digging, or 
was that on the next occasion that you visited the site? 
^ I A It viould have been logical that v*e got that, far on the 
2 first day, but considering the extent of what we did to find 
3 this' leak, it might have been the second day. 
4 Q What did you see then when you finally saw the leak? 
5 J Describe for me what you observed. 
A Well, we observed the fact that we had a leak in the 
pipe next to a fitting. It become evident that we had to 
remove the pipe and the fitting to be able to do any sort 
of repair at that point. And this means we ciear out as 
much around the line as is possible, so that we can get into 
the area and cut off the pipe, prepare to either put a 
section in it, replace the fittings, or repair the—replace 
it complete. 
0 You use the word fitting. A fitting is essentially 
a connecting—piece of pipe that connects two other pieces 
of pipe? 
A You have either a coupling that connects the two pieces 
of pipe or an elbow that rhe pipe comes in and makes a turn 
upon. Either one of them would be termed a fitting. 
Q Was this a coupling, or was this an elbow? 
A I don't remember. 
0 But do you recall that the break you observed was in 
the proximity of the fitting? is that correct? 
A Yes. 



































1 fractions of an inch? 
2 A Fractions of an inch. 
3 Q Fractions of an inch? 
4 (Witness nods head.) 
5 Q Was it on the underside of the pipe, or was it on the 
6 top side of the pipe, or had the pipe actually made a clean 
7 break? 
8 A The pipe was broke. 
9 I 0 When you talk about a clean break, you refer to a clean 
break as what? 
A The pipe had broken to the extent that it was—the only 
thing keeping anything into it was the surrounding area of 
the—what was packed around it. 
Q So the pipe was no longer touching? 
A They would have been touching, but it would have been 
basically sheared off. 
Q Was it sheared at all points around the pipe, however? 
18 | A Yes. That it was completely sheared, I do not remember; 
but it was substantially broken. There may have been a small 
portion of it holding on, but the majority of it was a shear 
break. 
Q Do I understand correctly that this shear did not 
actually include the coupling, but was so close to the 
coupling that it necessitated removal of the coupling as 


























A Yes, because the threads of the remainder of that pipe 
would be in that coupling; and it's almost impossible to 
remove those out of it and use that fitting again. We would 
not choose to do that. We would choose to remove that and 
replace that fitting. 
Q Was this break a smooth break? Was it on an even plane, 
just like a straight line, or was it cracked in its uneven 
fashion, like teeth or something? 
A Well, breaks in that case don't break as though you 
had cut them. They would be somewhat uneven. 
Q On previous occasions where you had done this type of 
repair had you seen this type of break? 
A Yes, we've seen this type of break before. It's not 
very often. It was mostly they would be corrosion where 
the pipe was literally ate up. 
Q How does a corrosion break in your experience as you 
observed one differ from the type of break you're describing 
here? 
A Well, to explain that you would have to understand the 
procedures of electrolysis, where this procedure of 
electrolysis the metal materials are basically eaten up by 
the electrical discharge at that point to where you'd have 
basically only the carbon of the metal left, which becomes 
a crusted material, which has no tensile strength. And at 
that point it gets to the point that the pressure will 
i actually push that away from the material, and the fuel will 
2 leak out of it. 
3 0 In the case of a corrosive break, are they generally 
4 complete breaks throughout the pipe, or can it be— 
5 A No. No. They're generally just small areas, and many 
6 of those will look like a little crater that's just down 
7 from a large area on the outside of the pipe down to maybe 
e a pinhole the size of a pencil lead at the inside, and other 
g J than that you will find serpentine areas along the pipe for 
a distance where it is corroding where you will have little 
crack lines running parallel with the line. And those 
corroded areas will force out or chip out. 
Q Did Mr. Boley observe this break when you had 
encountered it and identified where it was at? 
A He was present at the station. 


















Q So he would have knowledge also in terms of observation 
of what the nature of the break was; is that correct? 
A He should have. 
Q Anybody else that would have observed the break other 
than Mr. Boley and your son and perhaps Mr. Sumner at least 
in seeing the pipe after it was taken out of the ground? 
A Well, a piece of material like this becomes what we 
4 
1
 I would call show and tell. And we talk about the 
2 I circumstances of "This is what wc found on the job, and this 
3
 J is the extent to which the corrosion was," or the break, 
or that sort. And usually in shop talk, if you had bad 
* | corrosion and you had a loss of, "Well, this is the area 
6
 I that was lost and we founa it in this kind of condition," 
7
 whether it was dirt that had been left in the line when there 
8 should have been sand around the lines, or whether it was 
9 buried in a native soil, it does make a difference. If 
TO any dirt is against a line, even though you're m a sanded 
n area, it will ground at that point of dirt, and you will 
12 get a leak. 
13 Q What do you mean when .you say "Grounded at that point"? 
14 A Well, all fuel traveling in a pipe generates electricity 
15 and that electricity has to discharge somewhere, and it will 
16 discharge where there is a clear grounding source. Sand 
w is not a clean grounding source. But wherever it would touch 
i8 an earth, then there would be enough there for it to start 
19 going through the pipeline and into that grounding source. 
20 When that takes place, electrolysis sets in. Corrosion of 
21 the line begins. And at some time in the future you will 
22 have a hole in that line. 
23 Q Now, was that particular set of circumstances present 
24 at the point where you dug up this particular break? 







 Q Was there any indication from what you observed of the 
2
 break that that level of corrosion had any impact on the 
3
 I fact of the break had occurred? 
A It would weaken the line. It would make it susceptible 
5
 ] to damage. 
Q Now, on the previous occasions where you had seen this 
type of break in your work, in any of those circumstances 
8
 I had you been in possession of facts to indicate exactly what 
9
 J had caused those breaks to occur, like a car ran over it 
or somebody dropped a heavy object in the vicinity or an 
earthquake or whatever? 
12 I A Occasionally we would have information of that type. 
13 But sometimes we didn't. And to what reason wouldn't be 
14
 available. Occasionally we would know that there had been 
15
 a problem in the area. Occasionally we wouldn't know why 
16
 it was there. 
17
 I Q In those situations where you knew what had caused the 
particular break that was similar to the one we're talking 
19 I about in this case, what type of circumstances historically 
20 had you had knowledge of that would cause those kinds of 
21 breaks? 
22
 A Well, we had a Shell sort of station in Willows that 
23 was a rather open area, and we had a lot of corrosion 
24 problems in that station. And occasionally we would find 
25 fittings that were corroded through. We had a lot of 
10 
11 
i fittings corroded through there, I don't remember whether 
2 we had any breaks in there, but we did have heavy equipment 
3 roll over that area, and those lines were not buried as 
* deeply as they should have been- Consequently, we had a 
5 few breaks in those areas; but if the line was broken, the 
6 ground had to be substantially moved to cause that. 
7 Q Was there anything about the manner in which you 
e observed the maintenance of this particular pipe now at the 
9 J Gridley station that would indicate to you that it had not 
been properly maintained? 
A No. Maintenance is not a question. Once it's 
12 I underground, maintenance is not a question. 
13 Q Had it been buried sufficiently deep? 
u A This line was buried fully sufficiently, yes. The lines 
is J above it I questioned, but they were not broken. 
0 Are these lines all running parallel to each other? 
i? I A Yes. 
18 0 Immediately above this particular clean break that 
19 I you've described on the older line, there were newer lines 
that remained intact; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
22 I 0 Did you undertake at the time of the repairs that you 
23 were making on this line to determine what had caused the 






M A No. No, that's not a—my problem is to repair the 
2 problem. My problem is not to—Mr. Dockindorf is a man who 
3 J is concerned with lawsuits, as he has been sued a number 
of times for frivolous things. And his view is: MWe don't 
5 j care what caused it. Fix it." And he's very pertinent about 
6 that, 
7 Q Apart from your official performance in this case in 
B this matter, where you didn't officially try to f m a oat 
9 what happened, did you unofficially or just as a matter cf 
io your own curiosity attempt to tina out what haa happenea, 
n why this break had occurred? 
12 A Well, when you arc working in the maintenance won: tnat 
13 we are, it may run through our mind: "Why did this happen?" 
u And if I was installing the system, what could I have done 
15 to prevent it? But that would be probably the extent of 
16 our consideration of it, especially on an old station tnat's 
17 been there for a number oi vears.^ That runs you into 
is proolems in itself. 
19 Q Is this what you would characterize as an old station 
20 that had been there for a number of years? 
21 A It's been there quite a while. 
22 0 So in this instance I take it you didn't attempt to 
23 figure out in your mind where the break had happened at the 
24 (time you were repairing the break; is that correct? 
25 |A No. I don't recall any discussions concerning it or 
1 anything else of the sort. The point is: "How long am I 
2 going to be out of service? When can we get back?" So you 
3 don't spend time worrying about how it happened. You spend 
4 the time worrying about how you can get it back in service. 
5 Q Now, when Mr. Dickman called you about this problem, 
6 did he ask you, "Do you have an opinion as to why that breaK 
7 occurred?" 
8 A He may have—he may have asked me, but I told him, 
9 "That's not my responsibility." 
10 It just seems to me that he did ask me if I thought 
n it was, and I said: "It's not my responsibility to determine 
12 why.. It's my responsibility to repair it." 
13 Q Did he suggest to you any explanations for why it 
M occurred? Did he say, "Well—" 
15 A No, I don't—I don't remember that he did. 
16 Q How about your conversations with Mr. Mitchell? Has 
17 he suggested to you any explanations for why this break 
18 occurred? 
19 A He questioned me as to whether the possibility of the 
earthquake could have caused that; but, once again, it's 
not my determination, and I told him so. 
Q How far is Gridley from Chico? 
A Approximately 37 miles. 
Q You didn't reside i n — 
































Q You didn't reside in Gridley back in the 1986-1985 
period, did you? 
A No. I was not residing there, 
0 And you didn't work there either, did you, other than 
going from time to time to customers that might require your 
services; is that correct? 
A Maintenance calls. 
Q To the extent that there may have been any sort of 
earthquake in the Gridley area, your knowledge of that was 
merely based on whatever you might have read in the papers 
or had been told; is that correct? 
A Yes. That would be the extent of my knowledge. 
Q I should ask you, are you all right. We've been going 
for a while here. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
Q At the time that you did these repairs, did you observe 
any construction on property adjacent to this GasfnfSave 
property? 
A No, I don't believe I did. 
Q What type of soil was actually there at the point at 
which the break had occurred? 
A This area is an adobe clay. There was—there was 
substantial amount of native soil around the lines. 
Q Did you ever speak with anybody from a company known 





A I don't recall having done so. 
Q The only repair that you did was of this particular 
break in the pipe at that time? 
A No. We placed the entire lines from mat point up to 
the dispensers. 
Q But that entire repair was solely because of the fact 
that there was a break at that point in the pipe; is that 
8
 I correct? 
9
 (Witness nods head. ) 
10
 I Q Yes? 
A Yes. It's a simpler situation to put in a new line 







 J Q When you found the particular leak, did you have any 
14












gas would come out at any given interval? 
A We do not put fuel back in the lines until we have a 
final--the dispensers are badk on line and we are ready to 
test for leaks. By that time we have tested our lines with 
pressure tests and have found no leaks. And then thereafter 
we would put fuel into the lines and see if there was by 
chance anything that we had missed before the system would 
be covered up. 
Q Have you ever heard of a person named Evyleen Payne? 
A It doesn't strike anything in my recollection. 










A I've heard the name, but it's not—it's not anything 
that I associate with anytning. 
0 Not with this case, I take it? 
A No. There is an engineering company in Chico by the 
name of Rolls, I think it is. Other than that, I don't 
associate it with anything. 
MR. OLSON: I believe that's ail I have. 
EXAMINATION BY MR. MITCHELL 
Q In your testimony, sir, you stated thar you would 
















the place where you repaired it; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
0 What do you mean by 25 percent corrosion? 
A Approximately 25 percent of the pipe in areas theie 
would be approximately 25 percent of the pipe was not there. 
In other words, it had rusted away probably 25 percent of 
the existing thickness of the pipe, 
Q When there has been 25 percent corrosion in the pipe, 
does that mean that the pipe has to be replaced, or is it 
still fit to remain in the ground? 
A Oh, no. No. 25 percent corrosion is just enough that 
you can't sufficiently rethread the pipe to get a fitting 
on it. There would be deep areas in it that would not 
possibly thread, and you would have notches into your thread. 











0 So the pipe still maintains its strength? 
A A substantial amount of its strength, yes. 
0 And it's perfectly okay to remain in the ground and— 
(Witness nods head.) 
MR. OLSON: Object to the leading nature of the 
question. 
A It's there and would be there and probably in more 
8
 I stations than we would li*e to know of. 
Q (By Mr. Mitchell) Would that be essentially 25 percent 
of its life? 
A No, sir. 
12
 I MR. OLSON: Objection. 
13
 J A No, it wouldn't have anything to do with its life. 
Q (By Mr. Mitchell) Was this break caused by corrosion? 
MR. OLSON: Objection. No foundation. 
A It would be illogical. 
Q (By Mr. Mitchell) Illogical? 
A Illogical. 
19
 | Q Why? 
MR. OLSON: Objection. Again, no foundation. 
21
 I A Corrosion does not cause a clean break. 
22
 Q (By Mr. Mitchell) That's based upon your experience 
23 over many years? 
24
 I A My experience in dealing with the product. 













MR. OLSON: Nothing further. 
(At 2:37 p.m. the deposition ended.) 
Witness 
County of Salt Lake ) 
) ss. 
7
 State of Utah ) 
8
 This is to certify that the witness read the foregoing 
9
 I deposition; and if there are any changes to be made, they 
10 i
 a r e indicated by the witness on the attached correction 
n
 I sheet. 
'2 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
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My commission expires 
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This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) and (4) (1987). 
II. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the district court correct in granting Appellees 
Gridley Associates, Ltd., Petroleum Management, Inc. and Vernon 
G.W. Dickman (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Gridley 
Associates11) summary judgment on the basis that the gasoline 
spill at Gridley Associates1 self-service gasoline station in 
Gridley, California, which was discovered in February of 1986, 
was "sudden" within the meaning of the insurance policy issued 
by Appellant Transamerica Insurance Company ("Transamerica") as 
a matter of law under the undisputed facts and was thus covered 
under the policy? 
2. In the alternative, even if it is assumed for 
purposes of argument that the gasoline spill was not "sudden" 
within the meaning of the policy, is Transamerica barred from 
denying coverage on that basis as a matter of law because 
Transamerica never raised that contention until over three years 
after the spill when Transamerica filed its motion for partial 
summary judgment in the district court? 
1 
3, Can issue 2 above properly be decided on this 
appeal? 
The foregoing issues present questions of law which this 
court reviews without according any particular deference to the 
district court's decision. 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, rules 




This case arose out of a gasoline spill from an 
underground metal pipe running from an underground storage tank 
to a gasoline pump at Gridley Associates1 self-service gasoline 
station in Gridley, California. The spill, which was discovered 
in February of 1986, resulted from a clean break in the pipe 
caused by some type of earth movement such as that caused by an 
earthquake or heavy equipment. The Transamerica policy issued 
to Gridley Associates provided coverage for gas spills if they 
were "sudden and accidental." Transamerica initially agreed 
that the loss was covered by its policy and in fact paid a 
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portion of the cleanup costs. However, several months later 
Transamerica reneged on its coverage agreement and refused to 
pay the very substantial cleanup costs necessary to clean up the 
spill or to defend Gridley Associates in two lawsuits commenced 
by third parties to recover damages caused by the spill. 
The various positions taken by Transamerica over the 
years in denying coverage under the policy for the spill were a 
tribute to the ingenuity of Transamerica and its counsel. 
Transamerica tried on for size at one point or another literally 
every defense to coverage possible. Then, three years after the 
spill and three law firms later, Transamerica filed a Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment in the district court shortly before 
the scheduled trial date of this case. In that Motion, 
Transamerica raised for the first time the argument that the 
gasoline spill was not covered under the policy because the 
policy only provided coverage for spills which were "sudden and 
accidental11 and the Gridley spill was supposedly not "sudden." 
For the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is 
respectfully submitted that the- district court correctly 
rejected Transamerica!s contention and determined as a matter of 
law that the spill was indeed "sudden." In the alternative, 
Transamerica is barred as a matter of law based upon the 
undisputed facts below from arguing that the spill was not 
"sudden" because that contention was not raised for over three 
years after the spill occurred. 
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V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Proceedings in the District Court. 
Gridley Associates commenced this lawsuit in 1988 
seeking a determination that the gasoline spill at the Gridley 
Station was covered under Transamerica's policy and to recover 
damages from Transamerica on various theories, including breach 
of contract, fraud, bad faith refusal to pay, declaratory relief 
and estoppel. [R. 2-71] Thereafter, Gridley Associates filed 
an Amended Complaint. [R. 198-268] Substantial discovery was 
completed by the parties and the case was scheduled for trial on 
June 13, 1989. [R. 324] 
In April, 1989, shortly before the scheduled trial date, 
Transamerica filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
contending for the first time that the gasoline spill was not 
covered under Transamerica's policy because it was not "sudden." 
[R. 327-365] On May 12, 1989, the district court issued a 
minute entry denying Transamerica*s motion and ruling as a 
matter of law that the gasoline leak was "sudden." [R. 542] 
Because the district court had rejected the only ground upon 
which Transamerica then relied to avoid coverage, the effect of 
the ruling was to grant summary judgment in favor of Gridley 
Associates that the gasoline spill was in fact covered under 
Transamericafs policy. 
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Transamerica and Gridley Associates then entered into a 
Settlement Agreement pursuant to which Transamerica agreed to 
pay a minimum agreed to amount towards the damages and cleanup 
costs of the spill. Transamerica reserved the right, however, 
in the event that the cleanup costs exceeded the agreed to 
settlement amount, to appeal the district court's ruling that 
the gasoline spill was "sudden." Transamerica agreed that the 
only contention it would thereafter be entitled to make in this 
litigation was that the gasoline spill was not covered because, 
as a matter of law, it was not "sudden." 
The cleanup costs in fact exceeded the agreed to minimum 
settlement amount and Transamerica exercised its right to appeal 
the district court's ruling. The parties stipulated to the 
entry of a final judgment in favor of Gridley Associates and on 
December 13, 1990, the district court entered a partial summary 
judgment in favor of Gridley Associates which was certified as 
final under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It 
is from this judgment that Transamerica has appealed. 
B. Objection to Transamericafs Factual Statements. 
Gridley Associates objects to the following factual 
statements contained in Transamerica's Brief. 
1. Transamerica states that the "leak occurred in a 
section of the pipe which had been weakened by the gradual 
process of electrolysis," implying that the underground gasoline 
pipe simply gradually corroded away. [Transamerica Brief, p. 6] 
5 
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issue, testified that all metal pipes gradually corrode over the 
years through the process of electrolysis and that there had 
been approximately 25% corrosion in this pipe, meaning that 
approximately 25% of the existing thickness of the pipe had 
rusted away. However, Mr. Hankins testified that the pipe still 
retained a substantial amount of its strength and that the break 
was not caused by corrosion because corrosion does not cause a 
clean break. The break was caused by some type of movement of 
the earth. [Hankins Depo., Appendix G to Transamerica Brief, 
pp. 9-10, 58-59] 
2. Transamerica states that the gas spill continued 
over a period of four months. [Transamerica Brief, p. 24] In 
fact, although the precise period of time which the spill 
continued is unknown, it appears from the records of gas lost 
that the underground pipe broke in late November of 1985. [See 
summary of gasoline lost set forth on page 5 of Transamerica's 
Brief] The break was discovered and repaired in early February, 
1986. Thus, the spill continued for a period of approximately 
2 1/2 months. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The following facts were undisputed in the court below: 
1. At all relevant times, Gridley Associates owned and 
still owns a self-service gasoline station located in Gridley, 
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California (the "Gridley Station"). [R. 200; Transamerica 
Brief, p. 4] 
2. During the period of time from February 7, 1985 
through March 7, 1986, the Gridley Station was covered under a 
policy of insurance issued by Transamerica (the "Policy"). The 
Policy was a renewal Policy and covered other gas stations as 
well. [R. 199-200; Transamerica Brief, p. 4] 
3. In early 1986, Gridley Associates suspected gas may 
be leaking at the Gridley Station. In February, 1986, Gridley 
Associates asked Dockindorf Equipment Company to conduct an 
investigation to determine if it could find any gas leak. 
During the course of the investigation, Dockindorf discovered 
that an underground metal gas line running from the underground 
gasoline storage tank containing regular gasoline to a fuel pump 
had broken. As a result of this break, every time the gasoline 
pump was activated by a customer, gasoline leaked underground. 
[Hankins Depo., Appendix G to Transamerica Brief, pp. 6-12] 
4. The underground pipe had a clean break caused by 
some type of earth movement such as is caused by an earthquake 
or heavy equipment. [Kankins Depo., Appendix G to Transamerica 
Brief, pp. 10-12] 
5. After the leak was discovered, Gridley Associates 
was required to undertake an extensive cleanup program. Gridley 
Associates hired American Environmental Management Co. to handle 
the cleanup which has not yet been completed. In March, 1986, 
Gridley Associates made claim under the Policy for the costs of 
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cleanup. Robert Lakata ("Lakata") at the Sacramento office of 
Transamerica initially handled the claim. [ R. 604, Lakata 
Depo., p. 10] 
6. During April and early May of 1986, Lakata 
investigated the claim and had various communications with Ray 
Yenchick ("Yenchick") who was a senior casualty underwriter for 
Transamerica in the Denver office. Yenchick in turn had 
communications concerning the claim with Ray Hood, the casualty 
claims supervisor for the Denver region. [R. 604, Lakata 
Depo., pp. 17-28 and Ex. 4 thereto; Yenchick Depo., Appendix A 
hereto, pp. 12, 25-35] 
7. The Policy contained a general pollution exclusion 
which excluded coverage for pollution spills unless they were 
"sudden and accidental." Unbeknownst to Gridley Associates or 
to Transamericafs agent, Transamerica had also inserted into the 
Policy a separate "absolute" pollution exclusion endorsement 
(not the pollution exclusion which Transamerica now relies upon) 
not contained in the prior policies which absolutely excluded 
any coverage for pollution spills and which Transamerica 
initially believed excluded any and all pollution claims under 
the Policy. However, after discussion between the Transamerica 
personnel, Transamerica determined that the Gridley Associates1 
claim was in fact covered under the "garage" coverage portion of 
the Policy to which the absolute pollution exclusion did not 
apply. It was further decided by Transamerica that Transamerica 
should not attempt to escape coverage by contending that the 
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general pollution exclusion contained in the Policy (upon which 
Transamerica now relies) applied on the basis that the spill was 
not "sudden and accidental.ff In this regard, on May 1, 1986, 
Yenchick noted in a file memo that: 
In checking through file, we have pollution 
exclusion on G.L. [general liability] coverage, but 
not on garage. 
5-1-86 
I discussed this claim w/Ray Hood-Denver 
claims. Since we do not have the absolute 
pollution excl. on the garage coverage, he does not 
believe the "sudden and accidental" provision in 
the policy will hold up. . . . 
Called Bob Lakata-advised him to provide 
coverage rather than risk causing a legal battle. 
[R. 604, Lakata Depo., pp. 28-29; R. 398, Yenchick Depo., 
Appendix A hereto, pp. 33-35 and Ex. 3] [Emphasis added] 
8. On May 2, 1986, Yenchick sent Lakata a memorandum, 
which stated: 
Per our phone conversation, I believe we 
should go ahead and provide coverage for this 
claim. I discussed the situation with Ray Hood-
Denver casualty claims supervisor - and he is of 
the same opinion. Since we do not have the 
absolute pollution exclusion on the garage 
coverage, we do not believe the policy's "sudden 
and accidental" provision will carry much weight in 
court. Rather than get tied up in a legal battle, 
which could be costly, I believe it would be much 
wiser to settle the claim. 
[R. 604, Lakata Depo., p. 28 and Ex. 7 thereto; R. 400, 
Yenchick Depo., Appendix A hereto, pp. 33-37] [Emphasis 
added] 
9. Based upon the communications between Lakata, 
Yenchick and Hood, Lakata advised Gridley Associates in early 
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May, 1986 that the claim was, in fact, covered and that 
Transamerica would pay the cleanup costs to be incurred. [R. 
604, Lakata Depo., pp. 28-29] In this regard, Lakata wrote a 
note to his file on May 5, 1986 stating: 
Received Yenchickfs 5/2/86; was contacted by 
Richard Burbidge (801-355-6677) insured's personal 
attorney. Informed him that our present position 
was that coverage applicable. I told him that we 
would not pay for testing or repairing the tanks or 
gas lines, only for cleaning up the adjoining 
property. 
[R. 604, Lakata Depo., pp. 26-29 and Ex. 4 thereto] 
10. In October, 1986, eight months after the spill was 
discovered, Transamerica issued Gridley Associates a check for 
$23,473.49 in payment of cleanup costs which had been billed to 
that date. At the same time, Transamerica attempted to reverse 
its previous agreement to provide coverage. Barbara Gilbert, an 
environmental claims attorney with Transamerica's home office, 
wrote Gridley Associates a letter dated October 9, 1986 advising 
Gridley Associates that Transamerica took the position that 
cleanup costs were not covered because: (a) the absolute 
pollution exclusion excluded coverage; and (b) that to the 
extent any alleged damages occurred on property owned or leased 
by Gridley Associates, there would be no coverage under the 
Policy. Transamerica did not take the position that the spill 
had not been "sudden and accidental.11 [R. 603, Gilbert Depo., 
pp. 50-51 and Ex. 12 thereto] 
11. On the same date that Ms. Gilbert advised Gridley 
Associates that the claim wasn't covered, she wrote a letter to 
10 
Transamerica's coverage attorney in Philadelphia, Michael 
Gallagher, acknowledging that Transamerica had, in fact, 
previously agreed to provide coverage. Ms. Gilbert stated, 
among other things, that: 
As you can see, we have gone ahead and paid 
for the cleanup costs associated with this oil 
spill. You will recall that there was some 
considerable confusion was to whether our 
Sacramento office had agreed to cover this claim. 
On September 28, 1986, I spoke with Mr. Bob Lakata 
of our Sacramento field office and he confirmed 
that he did, in fact, advise the insured's personal 
counsel that we would be covering the claim. 
[R. 603, Gilbert Depo., p. 53-54 and Ex. 13 thereto] 
12 • On November 25, 1986, Transamerica's coverage 
attorney in Philadelphia, Michael Gallagher, sent Gridley 
Associates a letter denying coverage under the Policy for 
cleanup costs. Mr. Gallagher stated that cleanup costs "do not 
come within the definition of -damages as provided for in the 
Transamerica policy" and that the absolute pollution exclusion 
excluded any coverage. Again, Transamerica did not take the 
position that the spill had not been "sudden and accidental." 
[R. 603, Gilbert Depo., p. 56-57 and Ex. 15 thereto] 
13. By letter dated December 23, 1986, Gridley 
Associates1 counsel disputed the denial of coverage. [R. 413-
414] 
14. Thereafter, during the first part of 1987, 
Transamerica retained the firm of Smylie & Selman in Los 
Angeles, California as new coverage counsel with respect to the 
matter. [R. 602, James Depo., p. 10] 
11 
Set of Interrogatories, Transamerica specifically stated that 
the grounds relied upon for its contention that the losses 
suffered by Gridley Associates as claimed in this action are not 
covered under the Policy were stated in the letters from 
Transamerica•s counsel referred to above, dated November 25, 
1986, September 25, 1987, October 1, 1987, January 21, 1988, and 
May 11, 1988. Again, there was no mention of any claim that the 
Gridley spill was not "sudden and accidental." [R. 376-77 J 
Appendix C hereto] 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The gasoline spill was "sudden" as a matter of law. 
The spill resulted from a clean break in the gas line caused by 
some type of earth movement such as caused by heavy equipment or 
an earthquake. The pollution exclusion in the Policy issued by 
Transamerica is generally used by insurance companies throughout 
the United States. Many courts have found the word "sudden" in 
the policy to be ambiguous because the word has more than one 
meaning and have therefore determined the word must be 
interpreted in favor of the insured. These courts have defined 
"sudden" to mean "unexpected" by the insured, and have found 
that the pollution exclusion simply excludes coverage for 
intentional pollution by the insured. This court should adopt 
that line of cases. Other courts have found the word "sudden" 
as used in the Policy to be unambiguous. Most of these courts 
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have defined "sudden" as "happening without prior notice or with 
brief notice." 
Under either line of cases, Gridley Associates is 
entitled to coverage in the present case. The gasoline spill 
was "sudden" because the gas line break and the resultant 
discharge of gas was unexpected and happened without any 
previous notice. The fact the spill continued undetected for 2 
1/2 months does not mean the discharge was not "sudden." The 
important point is whether the commencement of the spill was 
"sudden." No case has denied coverage under facts even 
approaching those in the present case. 
2. Even if it is assumed for purposes of argument that 
the gasoline spill was not "sudden" within the express terms of 
the Policy, nevertheless Transamerica is barred as a matter of 
law from denying coverage on that basis because Transamerica did 
not raise that ground for denying coverage for over three years 
after the gasoline spill occurred. Transamerica did not even 
raise that ground for denial of coverage in its Answers to the 
Complaint or Amended Complaint on in its Answers to 
Interrogatories in this case. An insurer is barred from raising 
an additional ground for denial of coverage after commencement 
of litigation which would have been uncovered by a reasonable 
investigation. Transamerica was fully aware of the facts 
surrounding the gasoline spill and made the conscious decision 
back in 1986 not to assert that the spill was not "sudden" as a 
defense to coverage. 
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3. Gridley Associates1 argument that Transamerica is 
barred as a matter of law from denying coverage on the basis the 
Gridley spill was not "sudden" was properly before the district 
court and is properly part of this appeal. Although the 
district court did not reach the bar issue because the court 
determined that the spill was "sudden" as a matter of law, 
Gridley Associates asserted the bar argument below and this 
court can affirm the district court's judgment on any proper 
ground, whether or not relied upon by the district court. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE GASOLINE SPILL WAS "SUDDEN" WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF THE POLICY AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Transamerica does not (and could not under the 
settlement agreement between the parties) seek reversal of the 
summary judgment on the basis that material issues of fact 
exist. Rather, Transamerica argues that the district court 
erred in determining based on the undisputed facts that the 
gasoline spill was "sudden" within the meaning of the 
Transamerica policy issued to Gridley Associates. For the 
reasons set forth below, it is respectfully submitted that the 
district court's ruling was entirely correct and should be 
affirmed. 
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The Policy issued to Gridley Associates by Transamerica 
was a standard "occurrence11 based policy utilized throughout the 
insurance industry. The general coverage provisions of the 
Policy provided that Gridley Associates was entitled to recover 
any losses for property damage caused by an "occurrence." 
"Occurrence" was, in turn, defined in the Policy as: 
An accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to conditions, which results in bodily 
injury or property damage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured. 
[Emphasis added] 
The Policy also contained various exclusions which 
limited its general scope of coverage. One of these exclusions 
was an "absolute" pollution exclusion which Transamerica 
originally relied upon in denying coverage to Gridley Associates 
and which excluded all pollution spills from coverage. The 
absolute pollution exclusion is not relied upon by Transamerica 
on this appeal, nor was it relied upon by Transamerica in moving 
for partial summary judgment below because, as Transamerica 
itself finally recognized, that exclusion did not apply to the 
garage coverage portion of the Policy. Rather, Transamerica 
contended for the first time in its Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment that another more narrow pollution exclusion contained 
in the Policy excluded coverage. That pollution exclusion 
provided that: 
This insurance does not apply . . . to bodily 
injury or property damage arising out of the 
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, 
vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, toxic 
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials, or 
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or 
upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or 
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body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if 
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is 
sudden and accidental. [Emphasis added] 
The evidence was uncontradicted in the district court 
that the Gridley gas spill was caused by a clean break in the 
underground gas line running from the underground gasoline 
storage tank to one of the fuel pumps at the Gridley Station. 
The spill continued for approximately 2 1/2 months each time 
that the fuel pump was activated. Based upon these undisputed 
facts, Transamerica erroneously contended below and reasserts on 
this appeal that the spill was not "sudden" because it continued 
for more than a "brief" period of time. Transamerica cites 
numerous cases trying to support this position. There is, 
however, a glaring omission from Transamericafs brief. With one 
exception, Transamerica carefully omits to recite for the court 
any of the facts of the cases upon which Transamerica relies. 
The reason for this omission is transparent. The facts of those 
cases bear no resemblance to the case at bar. Each case relied 
upon by Transamerica in which coverage was denied on the basis 
that a spill was not "sudden" involved intentional pollution 
occurring as part of the regular course of business over a 
number of years. 
Transamerica tries to make the battleground issue of 
this appeal whether this court should adopt the reasoning of the 
many courts which have held the use of the word "sudden" in the 
standard insurance policy to be ambiguous or whether this court 
should follow the reasoning of other cases finding the language 
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to be unambiguous. Although Gridley Associates believes this 
court should adopt the reasoning of the former cases, it is 
respectfully submitted that the gasoline spill in the present 
case was "sudden11 under either line of cases and that 
Transamerica•s position that the gasoline spill is not "sudden" 
unless it is of brief duration finds no support in the vast 
majority of decisions rendered under both lines of cases. 
1. Many Cases Have Found the Undefined Use of the Word 
"Sudden11 to Be Ambiguous and to Mean "Unexpected" by the 
Insured, 
Many courts have found that the undefined use of the 
term "sudden" in the standard insurance policy is ambiguous 
because the word has more than one meaning. These courts have 
interpreted that ambiguous term in favor of the insured to mean 
"unexpected" by the insured, thus only precluding intentional 
pollution from coverage. Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 380 
S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989). 
The case of Broadwell Realty Services, Inc. v. The 
Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York., 528 A.2d 76 (N.J. 1987) 
is directly on point and is a good example of the position which 
Gridley Associates believes this Court should adopt. In 
Broadwell, gasoline had leaked for several months through 
fissures in an underground gasoline tank on the insured's 
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property. The insurance company contended that the gasoline 
spill was not covered because it was not "sudden." 
The Broadwell court rejected the insurance company's 
contention. The court reasoned that the meaning of the word 
"sudden" as used in the policy was ambiguous, that the meaning 
had received a great deal of attention in the cases over the 
years and had created a substantial amount of controversy. 
Nevertheless, the insurance industry had not seen fit to settle 
the issue by including more precise wording in its policies, 
which would have put the controversy beyond reasonable question. 
Therefore, the court said that any ambiguity had to be resolved 
against the insurer. 
In arriving at a definition of "sudden" as used in the 
insurance policy, the Broadwell court reviewed in depth the 
history of the general comprehensive liability policy and the 
pollution exclusion utilized by the insurance industry. The 
court noted that prior to 1966 the standard policy in the 
industry covered only property damage and personal injury 
"caused by accident" and that the word "accident" was undefined, 
leaving the definition up to the courts. In 1966, the standard 
policy was revised to provide for "occurrence" based coverage in 
response to consumer demands for broader liability protection 
and in acquiescence to the judicial trend toward a more 
expansive reading of the word "accident." [528 A. 2d at 84] The 
standard occurrence based policy defined "occurrence" the same 
as does Transamericafs Policy in the present case. 
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The general pollution exclusion relied upon by 
Transamerica in the present case was added by the 197 3 revision 
to the general comprehensive liability policy. The Broadwell 
court noted that according to the commentators, "the exclusion 
was designed to decrease claims for losses caused by pollution 
by providing an incentive to industry to improve its 
manufacturing and disposal processes." [528 A.2d at 85] Thus, 
the insured could not recover under the policy if he knowingly 
polluted the environment. The court concluded that the 
exclusion was only designed to eliminate coverage for pollution 
which was expected or intended by the insured, observing: 
There is substantial authority supporting the 
thesis that the pollution exclusion was intended to 
be co-extensive with the scope of the definition of 
occurrence. [Citation omitted] Citing statements 
made by the Insurance Service Office, commentators 
have argued that "limitation of coverage was 
intended to apply only to the intentional 
polluter." The pollution exclusion is [thus 
considered] an intentional polluter's exclusion, 
and, as such, [is] inapplicable to entities which 
neither expect not intend their conduct to result 
in bodily injury or property damage. [Citations 
omitted] Although this argument has its detractors 
[Citations omitted], most commentators "view the 
[policy limitation] as only a typical exclusion for 
intentionally caused damage by industrial or 
commercial dumpers." [Citation omitted] 
. . . 
We agree with this analysis. In our view, the 
pollution exclusion focuses upon the intention, 
expectation and foresight of the insured. If an 
insured knows that liability incurred by a 
foreseeable polluting event is covered by his 
policy, he is tempted to diminish his precautions 
and relax his vigilance. Conversely, we perceive 
no sound basis anchored in the policy language 
which requires prescience or clairvoyance on the 
part of the insured. Where the insured has taken 
reasonable precautions against contaminating the 
environment and the dispersal of pollutants is both 
accidental and unforeseen, we are of the view that 
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the "sudden and accidental" exception to the 
exclusion is applicable and the loss is thereby 
covered by the policy. 
[528 A.2d at 85-86] 
In United Pacific Ins. Co, v. Ban's West Lake Union, 
Inc.. 664 P.2d 1262 (Wash. 1983), the court affirmed a summary 
judgment that loss caused by gasoline leaking out of the 
insured's gasoline line over a period of several months was 
covered under the policy. In so ruling, the court concluded 
that the courts considering the pollution exclusion clause had 
"almost unanimously held it to be ambiguous." [664 P. 2d at 
12 65] The court then observed that: 
In the case before us, the liability insurance 
policy on the one hand covers an "occurrence", 
which by policy definition includes conditions 
which are continuing in nature (as the insured 
argues), while on the other hand the pollution 
exclusion clause in the policy excludes from 
coverage damages arising out of the escape of 
liquids, gases and other substances unless the 
escape is sudden (as the insured argues is the 
situation presented) . Both cannot be true yet both 
positions are reasonable, hence, the policy is 
ambiguous and requires judicial interpretation. It 
then follows that ambiguities in the policy are to 
be construed against the insurer which wrote the 
policy and in favor of the insured — particularly 
where an exclusion is involved as it is here. 
. . . 
The pollution exclusion was also added by the 
1973 standard revisions. The exclusion "eliminates 
coverage for damages arising out of pollution or 
contamination, where such damages appear to be 
expected or intended on the part of the insured and 
hence are excluded by definition of 'occurrence. ,lf 
[664 P.2d at 1264-1266] 
In New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity 
Co. , 673 F.Supp 1359 (D.Del. 1987), the court held the pollution 
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exclusion was inapplicable under the facts of that case, 
observing: 
. . . [A]n ambiguous term in an insurance contract 
is considered in favor of the insured and strictly 
against the insurer. [Citations omitted] An 
ambiguity is created when the terms of a contract 
permit two or more reasonable interpretations. 
[Citations omitted] 
The primary dictionary definition of the word 
"sudden" is "happening without previous notice" or 
"occurring unexpectedly." Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary, at 2284 (1971); See 
Blackfs Law Dictionary, at 1284 (1979). While 
other definitions indicate that the word has 
connotations of brevity, this only suggests that 
the word has more than one reasonable definition. 
In summary, the Court holds that the plain 
meaning of the word "sudden" as used in the 
pollution exclusion is ambiguous. Resolving the 
ambiguity in favor of the insured, the Court rules 
that the term "sudden" means a discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape of pollutants that is 
unexpected. 
[673 F.Supp. at 1362-1364] 
In Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 380 S.E.2d 686 
(Ga. 1989), the City of Jacksonville, Florida contracted to use 
property owned by Claussen as a landfill. Beginning in 1971, 
the city dumped industrial and chemical waste there almost 
exclusively. The city closed the site in 1977 and returned it 
to Claussen entirely filled, graded and seeded. Claussen had no 
knowledge that the site was used for dumping hazardous wastes. 
In 1985, the Environmental Protection Agency informed Claussen 
that he was responsible for cleaning up the site. Claussen then 
brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
pollution was covered under his insurance policy, which 
contained the same pollution exclusion as does Transamericafs 
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Policy. The Claussen court concluded that the pollution 
exclusion was capable of more than one reasonable interpretation 
and therefore "sudden and accidental" must be construed in favor 
of the insured to mean "unexpected and unintended." The court 
rejected Aetna's argument that the dumping of toxic wastes 
occurring over several years was not "sudden" within the policy 
language. In reaching this conclusion, the court said: 
Georgia courts have long acknowledged that 
insurance policies are prepared and proposed by 
insurers. Thus, if an insurance contract is 
capable of being construed two ways, it will be 
construed against the insurance company and in 
favor of the insured. [Citations omitted] 
What is the meaning of the word "sudden" as it 
is used in the insurance policy? Claussen argues 
that it means "unexpected." Aetna asserts that the 
only possible meaning is "abrupt." This seemingly 
simple question has spawned a profusion of 
litigation. The majority of courts considering the 
issue have adopted the meaning asserted by 
Claussen. [Citations omitted] Other courts have 
decided that "sudden" cannot be defined without its 
temporal connotation. [Citations omitted] 
The primary dictionary definition of the word 
is "happening without previous or with very brief 
notice; coming or occurring unexpectedly; not 
foreseen or prepared for." [Citations omitted] 
The definition of the word "sudden" as "abrupt" is 
also recognized in several dictionaries and is 
common in the vernacular. Perhaps, the secondary 
meaning is so common in their vernacular that it 
is, indeed, difficult to think of "sudden" without 
a temporal connotation, a sudden flash, a sudden 
burst of speed, a sudden bang. But, on reflection 
one realizes that, even in its popular usage, 
"sudden" does not usually describe the duration of 
an event, but rather its unexpectedness: a sudden 
storm, a sudden turn in the road, sudden death. 
Even when used to describe the onset of an event, 
the word has an elastic temporal connotation that 
varies with expectations: suddenly, it's spring. 
[Citation omitted] Thus, it appears that "sudden" 
has more than one reasonable meaning. And, under 
the pertinent rule of construction, the meaning 
favoring the insured must be applied, that is, 
"unexpected." 
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{380 S.E.2d at 688] 
The Claussen court also rejected the contention raised 
by Transamerica in the present case that this interpretation of 
"sudden11 just restated the definition of "occurrence11: 
The policy goes on to describe "occurrence" as 
"property damage neither expected nor intended from 
the standpoint of the insured." Aetna contends 
that if "sudden" is interpreted as "unexpected," it 
simply restates the definition of "occurrence." We 
do not agree. The pollution exclusion clause 
focuses on whether the "discharge, dispersal or 
release" of the pollutants is unexpected and 
unintended; the definition of occurrence focuses on 
whether the property damage is unexpected and 
unintended. The pollution exclusion clause 
therefore has the effect of eliminating coverage 
for damage resulting from the intentional discharge 
of pollutants. 
[380 S.E.2d at 688-689] 
In Summit Assoc, v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. , 550 A.2d 
1235 (N.J. 1988) , a developer purchased real estate which had 
been used as a sewage treatment facility twenty years earlier. 
The developer did not know that any portion of the sewage 
treatment facility remained buried at the site, nor that there 
was any sludge or hazardous substance buried there. In the 
course of preparing the site for development, an underground 
pipe leading from a large underground sludge pit was disturbed 
and began leaking hazardous liquid which continued for a 
substantial period of time. The court rejected the insurance 
company*s contention that the spill was excluded from coverage 
by the pollution exclusion, ruling that the exclusion only 
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eliminated coverage where the damage appeared to be expected or 
intended by the insured. 
In Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 444 N.W.2d 813 
(Mich. 1989), the court affirmed a summary judgment against the 
insurance company determining that the leakage of toxic by-
products through holes in a corroded underground storage tank 
which continued for a period of weeks was in fact "sudden" as 
used in the pollution exclusion clause because the leak was 
unexpected. 
Numerous other courts have adopted the same 
interpretation of "sudden" as meaning "unexpected" by the 
insured. See, e.g. , Benedictine Sisters v. St. Paul Fire and 
Marine Ins. . 815 F.2d 1209 (8th Cir. 1987) (soot discharged from 
boiler over a period of six months was "sudden"); Shapiro v. 
Public Service Mut. Ins. Co. . All N.E.2d 146 (Mass. 1985) (oil 
leaking from corroded underground fuel tank into surrounding 
waterways over a period of time was "sudden"); Kipin Industries 
v. American Univ. Ins., 535 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1987); Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980) (gasoline 
leaking from underground storage tank over a period of time was 
"sudden"); Du-Wel Products v. U.S. Fire Ins., 565 A.2d 1113, 
1117 (N.J. 1989) (all that is required to qualify for the 
exception to the exclusion is that the continuous discharge of 
the pollutants be unintended (i.e. accidental) and unexpected 
(i.e. sudden)); Headlev v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 
712 F.Supp 745 (D.S.Dak. 1989); Reliance Ins. Co. of Illinois v. 
27 
Martin, 467 N.E.2d 287 (111. 1984): Buckeye Union Ins. v. 
Liberty Solvents and Chemicals Co. , Inc., 477 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio 
1984); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495 
(Minn. 1988) ; New England Gas & E. Assoc, v. Ocean Ace, and 
Guar. Corp.. 116 N.E.2d 671, 680 (Mass. 1953). 
This court recently stated in C.J. Realtor Inc. v. 
Willev. 758 P.2d 923, 928-929 (Utah App. 1988) that a contract 
is ambiguous when it admits of two or more plausible meanings. 
The most that can be said about the pollution exclusion in the 
present case from Transamerica • s standpoint is that it is 
ambiguous. Therefore, the exclusion must be interpreted in 
favor of the insured. See, e.g. , Fuller v. Director of Finance, 
694 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1985); Utah Farm Bureau v. Orville Andrews 
and Sons, 665 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 1983). 
2. The Gridlev Spill Was "Sudden" Even Under The 
Decisions Which Have Found the Word "Sudden" to be Unambiguous. 
Other courts have found that-the word "sudden" as used 
in the standard insurance policy is not ambiguous. Most of 
these courts have defined "sudden" to mean "happening without 
prior notice or with brief notice," which is the primary 
dictionary definition of the word. Some of these courts have 
also added "abrupt" to the definition. However, the primary 
definition of "abrupt" is "occurring without warning: 
UNEXPECTED." [Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1989] 
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Utilizing these definitions, the cases relied upon by 
Transamerica have denied coverage for intentional pollution 
occurring as part of the regular course of the polluter's 
business over a period of years even if the polluter did not 
intend or expect the resulting damage. These cases all involved 
pollution that occurred gradually rather than being sudden 
because of some accident such as a gas line break as in the 
present case. The facts involved in those cases are light years 
away from the facts in the present case. 
For example, in Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated F.M. Ins. 
Co. , 682 F.Supp 927 (S.D. Ohio 1987), a case relied upon by 
Transamerica, it was alleged that the insured had during the 
regular course of its business deposited radioactive waste on 
its property for years as part of its production of phosphoric 
acid. In fact, the radioactive waste was 35 feet high and 
covered an area of 3 0 to 4 0 acres. In denying coverage, the 
court said: 
This Court does not find the pollution 
exclusion involved in this" case to be ambiguous. 
The "sudden and accidental11 exception expressly 
applies to the "discharge, dispersal, release or 
escape" of the pollutants rather than to the harm 
caused by the pollutants. "Sudden" in its common 
usage, means "happening without previous notice or 
with very brief notice," while "accidental" means 
"occurring sometimes with unfortunate results by 
chance alone." 
. . . 
Several other courts have held that the 
pollution exclusion applied to the release of waste 
on a regular basis or in the ordinary course of 
business. . . . 
In the case at bar, Amocofs complaint alleges 
that Borden regular deposited radioactive wastes on 
its property as part of its production of 
phosphoric acid. . . . Clearly, this is not an 
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allegation of a "sudden and accidental" event. 
Rather, it is precisely the type of activity which 
the pollution exclusion was drafted to preclude. 
[682 F.Supp at 930] [Emphasis added] 
In International Minerals and Chemical Corp. v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins., 522 N.E.2d 758 (111. 1988), another case relied upon 
by Transamerica, the insured as a normal part of its business 
and over a long period of time intentionally discharged 
hazardous waste onto the ground as part of its barrel 
reconditioning business. In holding that the discharge had not 
been sudden, the court noted that the dictionary defined 
"sudden" as "happening without previous notice or with very 
brief notice; abrupt, characterized by hastiness." [522 N.E.2d 
at 769] 
In State of N.Y. v. Amro Realty Corp., 697 F.Supp 99 
(N.D.N.Y. 1988), cited by Transamerica, the insured had polluted 
the environment by disposing of toxic solvents into drains and 
septic systems as part of the regular course of its business 
from the early 1950s through 1981. In denying coverage, the 
court determined that the word "sudden" was not ambiguous and 
remarked: 
There can be very little dispute that "sudden" 
means happening without previous notice or on very 
brief notice; unforseen; unexpected; unprepared 
for, Webster's New International Dictionary, 
(2d.Ed. Unabridged 1954), and that "accidental" is 
defined as happening unexpectedly or by chance; 
taking place not according to usual course, Id. 
Even if the term accidental is determined from the 
insured's point of view, there is no use of the 
word "sudden" which is consistent with events 
transpiring over a twenty year period. . . . This 
court doubts that the New York Court of Appeals 
would choose to emasculate an act of the 
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Legislature. Rather, the Court of Appeals would be 
persuaded by the logic of other courts which have 
addressed this issue and determined that 
allegations of continuous industrial pollution are 
clearly outside of the "sudden and accidental" 
exception to the pollution exclusion clause. 
[Citations omitted] 
[697 F.Supp at 110] [Emphasis added] 
In U.S. Fidelity and Guar, v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 
F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988), another case cited by Transamerica, 
coal dust was generated by the normal operation of Star Fire's 
business and was routinely discharged on a regular, continuing 
basis. The court held that this discharge was not "sudden" 
because "sudden" meant "happening without previous notice or 
with very brief notice", and concluded: 
Thus, we believe that such pollution exclusion 
clauses apply to the release of wastes and 
pollutants taking place on a regular basis or in 
the ordinary course of business. 
[856 F,2d at 35] 
Transamerica emphasizes Judge Jenkins1 decision in 
Hartford Ace. & Indem. Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. , 
(U.S.D.C. Central District of Utah, Case No. 88-C-1051J) 
(available at 5 Mealey's Lit. Rep. Insurance (Mealey) No. 18, 
3/12/91 at B-l). Transamerica!s emphasis is surprising. In 
Hartford, the pollution had occurred over fifteen years in the 
normal course of business. Judge Jenkins defined "sudden" to 
mean "happening without notice and occurring by chance" and 
simply ruled that the regular, continuous and routine discharge 
of pollutants over fifteen years was not "sudden and 
accidental." 
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In Transamerica Ins. Co, v. Sunnes, 711 P.2d 212 (Ore. 
1985) , another case relied upon by Transamerica, the court 
construed the very Transamerica policy provisions at issue in 
the present case. In Sunnes. the insured had intentionally 
discharged waste materials regularly over a period of many years 
so the court found the discharge was not "sudden11 and that the 
exception to the pollution exclusion did not apply. However, in 
so ruling, the court made the following comment about the 
pollution exclusion: 
The sense of the cases is that the pollution 
exclusion clause is designed to exclude coverage 
for occurrences in which pollutants are 
intentionally discharged, whether or not they are 
believed to be deleterious, while the exception 
Ti.e. "sudden and accidental"] provides coverage 
when the discharge of pollutants is not intended by 
the insured. The exception to the exclusion clause 
is concerned only with whether the discharge or 
release of pollutants is accidental or intended. 
. . . 
[711 P.2d at 214] [Emphasis added] 
Transamerica places importance on Waste Management v. 
Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986). However, in that 
case, the polluter intentionally dumped contaminating materials 
at a landfill over a number of years during the normal course of 
its business. 
Similarly, in F.L. Aerospace v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 
897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1990), cited by Transamerica, the 
polluter had intentionally transported liquid waste for storage 
during the normal course of its business for a period of 
approximately 2 1/2 years and it was alleged that the waste had 
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contaminated adjoining property. The court affirmed the 
judgment of the district court that there was no coverage 
because the polluter had presented no evidence as to how the 
contamination occurred. 
Every case relied upon by Transamerica in which a court 
has rejected coverage for a pollution spill involved industrial 
pollution where the polluter intentionally discharged pollutants 
into the environment in the regular course of its business over 
a period of years and then sought protection under an insurance 
policy when faced with cleaning up or paying damages for the 
intentional pollution. See, Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. 
Wasmuth, 432 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. 1988). Under such facts, it is 
not surprising that the courts held the polluters were not 
entitled to protection under the insurance policies and that the 
pollution discharges were not s-udden under any sense of the 
word. 
The facts of the present case are, of course, far 
different that the industrial polluter cases relied upon by 
Transamerica. Gridley Associates did not intentionally 
discharge gas into the ground during the normal course of its 
business. Rather, the discharge was an accident and resulted 
from a sudden break of a metal underground gas line caused by 
some type of earth movement continuing undetected for 2 1/2 
months. Clearly, the gas spill "happened without previous 
notice or with very brief notice" or "abruptly" or 
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"unexpectedly11 and is therefore covered under either line of 
cases discussed above. 
Transamerica appears to argue that even though the 
Gridley spill commenced suddenly, the spill is not covered 
because it only continued each time the pump was activated. The 
cases don't support such hair-splitting. If a spill starts 
"suddenly", it isn't turned into a gradual spill because the 
spill consists of a series of sudden discharges when a pump is 
activated. Further, it makes no sense to hold that whether a 
spill is "sudden" depends on which side of a valve a gas line 
breaks; if the line breaks on one side of the valve so the spill 
continues uninterrupted it is sudden, but if the break is on the 
other side of the valve so that the spill only continues when 
the valve is turned on the spill is not sudden. 
Realizing that the cases, rejecting coverage for 
pollution all involved discharges occurring during the regular 
course of business of the insured, Transamerica incredibly 
attempts to argue in this case that the Gridley gas spill 
occurred simply B S part of the normal business operations of the 
Gridley station. To characterize a sudden gas line break caused 
by movement of the earth in that manner is a little like calling 
a woodpecker a carpenter. Presumably, Transamerica would also 
argue that if a gas explosion occurred as a result of a customer 
smoking while filling his gas tank, the explosion was just a 
part of the normal operation of the business. 
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Transamerica asserts that the case of Industrial Indem. 
Ins. v. Crown Auto Dealerships. 731 F.Supp 1517 (M.D.Fla. 1990) 
(the one case from which Transamerica recites any of the facts) 
is "very similar" to the case at bar. In truth, the facts of 
the Industrial Indemnity case were far different. There, as a 
routine part of its business, the polluter continually poured 
oil into used oil holding tanks over a period of years. The 
employees routinely spilled small amounts of oil during the 
process of filling up the tanks. There were also occasional 
spills due to leaking hoses and pipe connections. Apparently 
the polluter did not take appropriate action to cleanup the 
spills as they occurred and over the years the pollution 
gradually built up. The court found that these spills occurring 
during the normal course of the daily business over a period of 
years were not "sudden and accidental." The Industrial 
Indemnity case may be similar to a situation where gas station 
employees or customers regularly spill small amounts of gas 
while they are filling up their gas tanks, but it is far 
different from the present spill which was caused by a "sudden 
and accidental" break in an underground gas line. 
3. The Fact that the Gridlev Spill Continued Undetected 
For 2 1/2 Months Does Not Mean the Spill Was Not Sudden. 
Transamerica urges the court to rule that a gas spill 
cannot 'be "sudden" unless it lasts only for a brief period of 
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time. Such a definition is not in accordance with the primary 
dictionary definition ("happening without previous notice or 
with very brief notice; unexpected, unprepared for11) or with the 
overwhelming case law. As the cases cited above demonstrate, a 
"sudden" discharge may continue for a substantial period of time 
and is not limited to an instantaneous happening. See, e.g., 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980). 
The focus of the courts has been on whether the discharge 
started suddenly, not how long it lasted. 
For example, in Just v. Land Reclamation Ltd. , 445 
N.W.2d 683 (Wis. 1989), the insured was sued for discharging 
pollution consisting of airborne dust and debris, noise, odor, 
and contaminated water in the course of its landfill business 
over a period of time. The complaint against the insured did 
not allege any dates of the alleged polluting events during the 
policy period, nor did the complaint allege how the pollutants 
were released into the environment. The court held there was no 
"sudden and accidental" event and denied coverage, observing: 
When policies limit coverage to sudden and 
accidental events, Wisconsin courts lint coverage 
to "injuries caused by a sudden and identifiable 
event with respect to both location and time." 
[Citations omitted] The term "sudden and 
accidental" does not apply to pollution damage 
occurring over a substantial period of time. 
[Citation omitted] There must be an accidental and 
"immediate" discharge. [Citation omitted] 
"Sudden" is defined temporally and not in terms of 
unexpectedness. 
[445 N.W.2d at 686] 
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Although the quoted language seems at first glance to 
lend some support to Transamericaf s argument in the present 
case, the Just court went on to distinguish its earlier decision 
in Wagner v. Milwaukee Hut. Ins. Co., 427 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. 1988) 
because in Wagner the accident caused the discharge to begin 
immediately even though the discharge continued over a number of 
years. In other words, the commencement of the spill had been 
"sudden." 
In Wagner, a case directly on point, an underground gas 
line at a self-service station was broken by construction work 
and leaked gas for three years before the break was discovered. 
The court held the spill was "sudden" and thus covered under the 
policy, saying: 
Milwaukee Mutual . . . argues the discharge 
was not "sudden" because it occurred over a 
"substantial period of time." [Citations omitted] 
. . . Milwaukee Mutual reasons that even though the 
injury to the pipe may have been immediate, the 
discharge itself accumulated over a course of three 
years. . . . 
We reject Milwaukee Mutual's position for 
several reasons. First, the discharge of gasoline 
was sudden. . . . The gasoline began leaking 
immediately after the pipe was damaged in 1981, and 
continued until it was discovered in 1984. . . . 
The length of time that elapsed before the leak was 
discovered is irrelevant to the suddenness of the 
discharge. The pollution exclusion clause does not 
preclude coverage where there is a sudden damage 
to a pipe and an immediate discharge of pollutants 
that continues uninterrupted for a prolonged period 
of time. 
[427 N.W.2d at 857] [Emphasis added] 
In Lumbermans Mut. Cas. v. Bellville Ind., 555 N.E.2d 
568 (Mass. 1990), another case upon which Transamerica places 
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emphasis, Bellville was sued for contaminating New Bedford 
Harbor with PCBs used in its manufacturing plant in the mid 
1970s. The United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts had certified to the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
the issue of the meaning of "sudden" as used in the pollution 
exclusion. The Massachusetts Supreme Court did not have before 
it the precise facts concerning the discharge of pollutants so 
it could not determine whether the discharge had been "sudden." 
The court did not rule that the length of time the discharge 
lasted was relevant. Rather, the court said: 
Surely, the abruptness of the commencement of 
the release or discharge of the pollutant is the 
crucial element. 
[555 N.E.2d at 572] [Emphasis added] 
Only a very few cases have stated any requirement that 
a pollution discharge last for only a short period of time in 
order to be a "sudden" discharge. It is respectfully submitted 
that this court should reject any such requirement in accordance 
with the decisions of the vast majority of the cases. Moreover, 
these few cases did not even attempt to define what a "short 
period of time" means and they are all distinguishable from the 
case at bar. 
For example, Transamerica relies heavily on Fireman's 
Fund Ins. Companies v. Ex-cell-o Corp., 702 F.Supp 1317 
(E.D.Mich. 1988). That court had no facts before it so it was 
not called upon to nor did it decide whether the discharge in 
38 
that case was covered under the policy, nor did the court make 
any effort to define what a "short time" was. 
Transamerica also relies on Technicon Electronics Corp. 
v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1988), aff fd, 74 N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542 
N.E.2d 1048 (1989). That case involved a manufacturer's 
intentional discharge of toxic wastes over several years during 
the regular course of its business. The Technicon court 
recognized and distinguished the previous New York case of 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., supra, where the court had 
stated that the discharge could be sudden even though the 
discharge continued "undetected for a substantial period of 
time.11 [533 N.Y.S.2d at 99] 
Transamerica also points to the case of 01 in Corporation 
v. Insurance Company of North- America, No. 84 Civ. 1968 
(S.D.N.Y., April 23, 1991) which again involved intentional 
dumping of pollutants over many years during the regular course 
of business. The Olin court stated that "no use of the word 
•sudden1 or 'suddenly1 could be consistent with an event which 
happened gradually over an extended period of time. . . . " 
Transamerica has not and cannot point to one case which 
even implies that a gasoline spill which starts suddenly and 
accidentally is not covered just because it continues for a 
period of 2 1/2 months undetected. The cases, in fact, clearly 
reject such a notion. 
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For this court to limit the definition of "sudden" to 
spills which continue only a brief time would also lead to 
uncertain and arbitrary results. The important fact in this 
case is whether the commencement of the spill when the gas line 
broke was sudden (which it admittedly was) , not how long the 
spill continued. If Transamericafs proposed standard is adopted, 
how long could a pollution spill continue after an accident and 
still be within the coverage of the insurance policy? For 
example, when the Exxon Valdez crashed, would the portion of the 
spill which occurred during the first few minutes or the first 
few hours only be covered, or would the portion of the oil spill 
which occurred over a matter of weeks be covered, or would the 
entire spill be excluded because it occurred over more than a 
"brief11 period of time? In the case at bar, would only that 
portion of the gas spilling within the first few minutes after 
the line break be covered or the first few days or the first few 
weeks? Or, because the spill continued for more than a "brief" 
period of time, would the entire spill be excluded from 
coverage? How would you determine which gas leaked when as far 
as Transamerica's obligation to clean up the gas is concerned? 
How would you determine what damage to surrounding property was 
caused by the portion of the gas that leaked during the time 
period which the court determined to be "sudden?" 
Finally, Transamerica's own interpretation of the 
"sudden" exception to the pollution exclusion is relevant to 
determining the meaning of that term in Transamerica's policy. 
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The undisputed evidence in the court below was that Transamerica 
consciously determined that it could not assert the Gridley 
spill was not "sudden" and instead agreed to provide coverage. 
For three years thereafter, Transamerica did not contend the 
spill was not "sudden." 
For all of these reasons, the district court correctly 
determined the gasoline spill in this action was "sudden" as a 
matter of law. 
B. TRANSAMERICA IS BARRED FROM DENYING COVERAGE ON THE 
BASIS THAT THE GRIDLEY SPILL WAS NOT "SUDDEN." 
1. Transamerica Did Not Raise the "Sudden" Argument For 
Three Years After the Spill. 
As set forth at length in Gridley Associates1 Statement 
of Facts [pp. 8-16, supra], the undisputed evidence before the 
district court consisting entirely of Transamericafs own 
correspondence and pleadings demonstrated that although during 
the years after the Gridley Spill, Transamerica through three 
different coverage counsel threw out any number of reasons the 
gasoline spill purportedly was not covered under the Policy, 
Transamerica never contended that the spill was not "sudden" 
until over three years after the spill was discovered, when in 
April, 1989, shortly before the scheduled trial date, 
Transamerica filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Transamerica did not even raise this contention in its Answers 
41 
